Ethical Issues in Different Social Science Methods

HERBERT C. KELMAN

The ethical issues arising in social science research tend to vary as a function of the particular research methods employed. For example, certain genres of social-psychological experiments have created ethical concerns because they involve misrepresentation of the purpose of the research to the participants or because they subject participants to stressful experiences. Some organizational or large-scale social experiments have been troubling because participation may be seen as damaging to the long-term interests of certain groups. Survey research has on occasion been criticized for probing into sensitive areas, such as sex, religion, or family relations. Participant observation research may constitute invasion of privacy, particularly when investigators gain access by misrepresenting themselves or make covert observations. Cross-cultural studies have been charged with exploitation of Third World populations and disrespect for their cultural values.[1]

The purpose of the present chapter is to provide an overview of the types of ethical issues that confront the different methods used in social research. The overview is intended to be more than a checklist, ticking off the problems that arise with each research method, but less than a comprehensive, overarching scheme for categorizing and organizing all of the problems. Instead, it takes the form of a rudimentary framework, designed to highlight some of the problems that will be discussed more fully in subsequent chapters and to suggest possible relationships between them.

The framework is itself rooted in a social science analysis, relevant to our concern with problems of social institutions (including the professions and the institution of scientific research), of social relations, and of social control. This kind of analysis may provide a systematic basis for answering some of the questions that have been central to the debate about the ethics of social research. One is the question of the appropriateness of a risk-benefit analysis to the ethical issues that arise in social and behavioral research. Such an analysis may or may not be useful for biomedical research, but perhaps a modified version of risk-benefit analysis or an entirely different approach—such as an analysis in terms of rights (including, of course, the right to protec-

tion against injury)—would be more appropriate to social research.[2] Another issue to which the present framework might contribute concerns the appropriateness of government regulations for the control of social research. Should social research be subject to government regulation at all? Should at least certain types of research be specifically exempt from regulation? If government regulations are indicated, should they take a form different from those designed for biomedical research or should they be applied in different ways? The framework may help us address such questions in a systematic way.

In the discussion that follows, I shall (1) present the framework and identify the ethical issues that it brings to the fore; (2) examine which of these issues arise for each of the different methods of social research that can be distinguished; and (3) draw out some of the general implications suggested by this analysis. Before turning to this discussion, however, I shall summarize the general approach to the problem of moral justification that underlies my analysis.[3]

Approach to Moral Justification

My ultimate criterion for moral evaluation of an action, policy, or institution—as well as of a general rule of conduct—is its effect on the fulfillment of human potentialities. Fulfillment of people's potentialities depends on their well-being in the broadest sense of the term: Satisfaction of their basic needs—including needs for food, shelter, security, love, self-esteem, and self-actualization—is both a condition for and a manifestation of such fulfillment. Furthermore, fulfillment of human potentialities depends on the availability of capacities and opportunities for self-expression, self-utilization, and self-development. We therefore have a moral obligation to avoid actions and policies that reduce others' well-being (broadly defined) or that inhibit their freedom to express and develop themselves. This is essentially a consequentialist view, in that it judges the moral rightness of behavior on the basis of its consequences. It differs from some standard utilitarian theories in the *particular* consequences that form the center of its concern—namely, consequences for the fulfillment of human potentialities. This definition of "the good" in turn implies a broader conception of human well-being that includes the satisfaction of such needs as self-actualization.

Most commonly accepted moral principles can be derived directly from analysis of the consequences of their acceptance or violation for the fulfillment of human potentialities. Clearly, violations of the principles of autonomy, nonmaleficence, and beneficence, described in the preceding chapter, have direct negative consequences for the fulfillment of potentialities. The importance of truth telling or keeping promises is not so obvious. Breaking a promise or telling a lie *may* inhibit fulfillment of the other's potential, depending on the precise nature of the benefit or the information of which that person is thereby deprived. But, to justify a general rule of truth telling or promise keeping, one

would have to introduce the additional notion that lying and breaking promises undermine interpersonal trust within the society, thus depriving everyone of one of the conditions necessary for fulfilling human potential. In this sense, then, lying and breaking promises are always (prima facie) wrong, regardless of the *specific* consequences for the individual so treated. In calculating the effects of lying, it is therefore not enough to weigh the harm caused to the individual subjected to the lie against the benefits (perhaps to many others—e.g., through the increase in knowledge produced by deceptive experiments) that the lie might bring in its wake. One must also take into account the larger effect of the lie in undermining interpersonal trust in the society.

More generally, I subscribe to the rule-utilitarian view that adherence to moral rules is important in order to maintain the integrity of the rules themselves. Thus, the mere violation of the rules against lying or breaking promises entails a social cost in that it weakens these rules and hence reduces the predictability and trust necessary for the fulfillment of human potentialities within a society. The same reasoning can be used to rule out certain classes of action entirely, regardless of any calculation of specific harms and benefits, on the grounds that these actions violate rules that are of paramount social significance. The presumption is that the larger social harm caused by the mere violation of these rules always outweighs any potential benefits that the actions might produce. On this presumption, I would argue, for example, that the act of killing or enslaving another can never be justified on the grounds that it would produce a greater good, although it might be justified on the grounds that it would prevent an even greater evil.

The last example underscores a difficulty in using the fulfillment of human potentialities as the criterion for moral evaluation. A rule that I regard of paramount social significance—namely, that we must never kill or enslave another on the grounds that such an act would produce some greater good—rests on the *mere presumption* that the larger social harm caused by the violation of this rule always outweighs whatever benefits the action might produce. Although a moral principle may be conceptually linked to the fulfillment of human potentialities, it is often very difficult to demonstrate empirically that violation of this principle—in a specific case or in general—has negative consequences for human fulfillment. The difficulty arises in large part from the fact that the predicted consequences are often due to the cumulative effect of violations of the principle. For example, a single lie may not have any demonstrable negative consequences, but the accumulation of lies may damage the self-esteem of the individual to whom these lies are directed, may lower the level of trust in the society, and may undermine the integrity of a rule essential to harmonious and effective social interaction. Such cumulative effects cannot be readily proven, and it is even more difficult to disprove them. We could avoid unnecessary ambiguity, therefore, by using a criterion for moral evaluation based on description of the action rather than on prediction of its consequences.

For this reason, I prefer to use consistency with human dignity as my working criterion for moral evaluation of an action, policy, or institution. The

principle of human dignity is very closely linked to the fulfillment of human potentialities. On the one hand, the fulfillment of one's potentialities is one of the determinants of personal dignity. On the other hand, respect for human dignity—as reflected in the treatment people receive from others and in social policies and institutions—is a necessary condition for the maximal fulfillment of human potentialities. But, while the principle of human dignity is conceptually linked to—and indeed derivable from—principles demanding fulfillment of human potentialities, it can be treated as though it were an end in itself in moral decision making. The principle holds whether or not its acceptance or violation has demonstrable consequences for self-fulfillment.

I define human dignity as "the status of individuals as ends in themselves, rather than as means toward some extraneous ends." Two components of human dignity can be distinguished, which serve as both operationalizations and conditions of dignity: identity and community. Identity refers to our capacity to take autonomous action, to distinguish ourselves from others, to live our lives on the basis of our own goals and values; community refers to our inclusion in an interconnected network of individuals who care for each other and protect each other's interests. According identity to others means respecting and fostering their autonomy and freedom of choice; according community to them means treating them as fellow humans and caring actively for their well-being. At the level of social policies and institutions, one can roughly equate the provision of identity with the prevalence of individual freedom and the provision of community with the prevalence of distributive justice, although I would stress that freedom and justice (and, indeed, identity and community themselves) are inseparable and interdependent conditions for realizing human dignity. The extent to which people are accorded identity and community (in interpersonal relations, in social policies, and in institutional arrangements) determines their (objective) level of dignity, as well as their (subjective) sense of dignity. To deny them identity or community is to treat them as means rather than ends and thus to deprive them of dignity, from both an objective and a subjective point of view. Moreover, implicit in the principle of human dignity is the requirement to accord others identity and community on a basis of equality: If individuals are ends in themselves, then each one—by virtue of being human—has equal worth.

My conception of human dignity places it clearly within a consequentialist framework: Respect for others' dignity is important precisely because it has consequences for their capacity and opportunity to fulfill their potentialities. However, to subscribe to consequentialism as a framework for justification does not mean to adopt act-utilitarian consequentialism as a method for moral decision making. I go on the *assumption* that violations of people's dignity reduce their capacity and opportunity to fulfill their potentialities. To some extent, this assumption can be evaluated empirically. For example, we can show in a particular situation that lying deprives people of information needed to protect their interests and meet their needs or contributes to an atmosphere of distrust within a community—thereby lowering the capacity for self-

fulfillment. Even in the absence of such demonstrable consequences, however, I assume that lying degrades and diminishes the person so treated and undermines the principle of truth telling—and thus generally weakens, at the individual and societal level, the conditions for fulfillment of human potentialities. According to my view of human nature and of the social order, these are necessary and immediate consequences of the action itself, consequences usually manifested only in their cumulative effects. Whether or not such consequences can be demonstrated in a given instance, I regard them as sufficient justification for evaluating the action as morally wrong.

The principle of human dignity, along with its two components, serves as a "master rule" from which other rules of moral conduct can be derived. Some of these rules—such as the rules against killing, injuring, or enslaving others—govern actions that are not only obviously inconsistent with respect for human dignity, but also have direct negative consequences for the fulfillment of human potentialities. This category includes actions that deprive others of their basic human needs (broadly defined), that reduce their freedom of self-expression and self-development (including their capacity and opportunity to pursue their own goals and protect their own interests), or that deny them equal access to such benefits and freedoms. Other rules—such as the rules against lying or breaking promises—govern actions that are also inconsistent with respect for human dignity but that may or may not have directly demonstrable consequences for the fulfillment of human potentialities. These rules ultimately derive their moral force from the *presumption* that the actions they proscribe have adverse consequences for the individual capacities and social conditions essential to personal fulfillment.

In any particular situation, moral conflicts may arise because two different moral rules require conflicting actions. To resolve such conflicts, we must make a judgment about the relative importance of the two rules—in general and in the particular situation—to the preservation of human dignity. Such judgments are not easy, particularly when they must take account of the long-term and systematic effects of violation of a rule, including effects on the continuing integrity of the rule itself. Equally difficult dilemmas, however, are faced by the act utilitarian, trying to assess (quantitatively) which action maximizes utility, or by the deontologist, trying to decide which is the overriding duty. Conflicts may also arise because an action that presumably contributes to creating the conditions for enhanced human dignity in the society at large (e.g., the advancement of social research) may deprive particular individuals of dignity (e.g., by lying to them). In many cases of this sort (such as the decision whether or not to carry out an important experiment that involves some deception of the participants), I would accept the need for weighing the relative costs and benefits of taking or not taking the action and choosing the one that is most consistent with the preservation and enhancement of human dignity. In calculating costs, however, I would consider not only the cost to the individual who is deceived, but also the long-term cost to the larger society. In other cases

(such as the decision about an important experiment that entails some risk of death or serious injury to the participants), the action represents so fundamental a violation of the principle of human dignity that it can virtually never be envisioned, no matter how valuable its social contribution may be.

Harm-benefit considerations clearly play a central role in my approach to moral justification, if harms are defined as experiences that detract from well-being and benefits as experiences that enhance well-being, and where well-being in turn refers to meeting one's needs, attaining one's goals, and having the capacity and opportunity to express and develop one's self. Human dignity, which is closely linked to the fulfillment of human potentialities, can be seen as a manifestation and condition of well-being. Thus, actions, policies, and rules deemed consistent with human dignity represent either ways of enhancing well-being, or ways of maintaining people's ability to assure their own well-being (i.e., protect their own interests, pursue their own goals, express and develop themselves). But, to say that harm and benefit considerations are central to moral justification does not mean—as it does for the act utilitarian—that the procedures for arriving at ethical decisions involve a calculation of immediate risks and benefits without reference to rules and other moral considerations. Risk-benefit analysis is a useful tool in ethical decision making, but it is not relevant, and certainly not conclusive, under all circumstances. For many purposes, I would consider a rights-based analysis as the most appropriate procedure for arriving at ethical decisions.

Rights, in my approach, are derivative from consequential considerations, and thus are not the ultimate source of justification for moral action. The use of fulfillment of human potentialities and of respect for human dignity as criteria for moral evaluation implies a right to self-fulfillment and dignity. And from this "right," one can derive various other rights, corresponding to the various "duties" implied by the moral rules based on respect for dignity. Thus, for example, one can speak of a right not to be lied to, corresponding to the rule against lying. But I do not postulate a set of rights as *independent* bases for moral action. I see rights as socially accepted and enforced protective devices, which assure people access to certain benefits, defense against certain harms, and continued ability to safeguard their interests, pursue their goals, and express and develop themselves. The value of rights is that they reduce the dependence of an individual's (or group's) well-being on others' calculations in particular circumstances of what is best for that individual (or group) and for society at large. They represent, in principle, noncontingent entitlements to certain resources or opportunities. In practice, of course, rights are not absolute. Judgments have to be made about competing rights, both in the sense that it may not be possible to grant a given right (e.g., the right to food or police protection) fully to everyone, because of limited resources; and in the sense that the right of one person (e.g., to speak freely) may conflict with a competing right of another (e.g., to be protected against intimidation). In weighing competing rights, one of the considerations is the relative cost of violating one as compared to

the other, including the relative social cost entailed by the reduced integrity of whichever right is being violated.

Rights, then—although their origin is ultimately in harm-benefit considerations—become functionally autonomous in that they retain their moral force whether or not, in any given case, it can be demonstrated that their violation will cause harm. Furthermore, maintaining the integrity of the rights is itself an important consideration in ethical decision making, because of the long-term, systemic consequences of their violation. In short, operationally, we take or avoid certain classes of action (defined by general moral principles) in order to conform to a right and to maintain the integrity of that right, not (or not *only*) in order to avoid the harm against which the right is designed to protect people. It is enough to say that the right is being violated; there is no need to prove that its violation causes measurable harm. Calculation of harms becomes especially important when the right conflicts with another right and some way of assigning priorities must be found.

A Framework for Identifying Ethical Issues in Social Research

The primary task of this chapter is to identify and classify ethical issues in social research in a way that would enable us to evaluate and compare the role different research methods play in creating or perpetuating these issues. In order to make the resulting scheme maximally useful for the present volume, I selected, as one of the bases for classifying ethical issues, the four issue areas around which the volume is organized: harm and benefit, informed consent and deception, privacy and confidentiality, and social control. These four issue areas constitute the rows of table 2.1, which summarizes the classificatory scheme. Of these four issue areas, the first three represent broad categories of

TABLE 2.1
A CLASSIFICATION OF ETHICAL ISSUES IN SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH

Issue Areas	Types of Impact of the Research		
	Concrete Interests of Participants	Quality of Interpersonal Relationships	Wider Social Values
Harm and benefit	Injury (physical, psychological, material)	Stress and indignity (discomfort, embarrassment, feelings of inadequacy)	Diffuse harm (perversion of political process, inequity, manipulation, arbitrariness)
Privacy and confidentiality	Public exposure	Reduced control over self-presentation	Reduction of private space
Informed consent and deception	Impaired capacity for decision making	Deprivation of respect (lack of candor, choice, reciprocity)	Erosion of trust (cynicism, anomie)
Social control	Government regulation	Professional standards	Social policy

ethical problems that social research confronts, while the fourth refers to socially patterned ways of dealing with such problems. For the fourth area, it should be noted, I am using a more inclusive description than the one used in the organization of this volume (social control instead of government regulation), since I want to cover a wider range of control mechanisms, of which government regulation is only one form.

The three categories of problems overlap to a considerable degree. Specifically, issues of privacy and deception could both be analyzed within a harm-benefit framework.[9] There is heuristic value, however, in separating them out, particularly since they encompass some of the special problems that are inherent in certain methods of social research.

Harms and benefits here refer to certain effects of a piece of research on the well-being of individuals and society. Well-being, in turn, can be gauged by the attainment of goals or valued states. Any effect that reduces people's well-being, by blocking achievement of a goal or interfering with a valued state (such as health, security, or social cohesion), constitutes a harm.[10] Any effect that enhances well-being, by promoting the attainment of goals or valued states, constitutes a benefit. The clearest examples of harms that might result from scientific research are lasting injuries or damages suffered by the research participants themselves. The term *harms*, as used here, however, also encompasses temporary experiences of stress or discomfort, even if they cause no measurable long-term damage. Furthermore, harms may accrue not only to the research participants themselves, but also to other individuals and groups affected by the process or products of research.[11] More generally, one may speak of harms to the society at large insofar as the process or products of research tend to reduce the integrity and effectiveness of social institutions in achieving societal goals and values.

Benefits may accrue to individual research participants in the form of improvements in health, help with personal (psychological or social) problems, specific services (such as child care, educational enrichment, and income supplementation), financial remuneration, new insights, enjoyable experiences, advantages to their groups or communities, or the satisfaction of contributing to the research enterprise. Benefits may also accrue to individuals and groups who do not personally participate in the research, and to society at large, "in the form of contributions to scientific knowledge and the general social welfare or public enlightenment generated by this knowledge."[12] Since ethical concerns are frequently generated by the potential of harmful effects in social research, I shall be emphasizing harms much more than benefits in this chapter. Benefits, of course, affect the amount of concern engendered by a piece of research, on the assumption that the greater its potential benefits to participants or to the larger society, the greater the justification for risking certain harms. As was noted in the previous chapter, however, ethical judgments are not based solely on the ratio between harms and benefits. There are certain kinds and degrees of harm that most of us would consider unac-

ceptable no matter how large the potential benefits might be (unless perhaps the risk of harm had been consented to by those affected). Moreover, ealculations of the risk-benefit ratio are complicated by the fact that those who are most likely to benefit from a research study are often not the ones who bear the attendant risks.

Turning to the second row of table 2.1, the issue of privacy and confidentiality relates to a harm-benefit framework in two ways: Invasion of privacy and violation of confidentiality can be viewed, in their own right, as harms of a speeial type; or they can be viewed as conditions that subject people to the possibility of harm. Oscar M. Ruebhausen and Orville G. Brim, Jr., define privacy as "the freedom of the individual to pick and choose for himself the time and circumstances under whieh, and most importantly, the extent to which, his attitudes, beliefs, behavior and opinions are to be shared with or withheld from others."[13] Since social research, by its very nature, focuses on precisely such personal information, it inevitably runs the risk of invading the participants' privacy. "Invasions of privacy occur to the extent that partiei-pants are unable to determine what information about themselves they will dis-close and how that information will be disseminated."[14] Violations of confi-dentiality occur when information about a participant is disseminated to audiences for whom it was not intended. They constitute a subclass of invasion of privacy, exacerbated by the breaking of a promise that was made—explicitly or implicitly—at the time the data were obtained.

Invasion of privacy cannot be described as a harm in the obvious sense of a lasting injury or measurable damage to the research participants. It can, how-ever, be subsumed under the category of harms that Alasdair MacIntyre designated "moral wrongs,"[15] i.e., acts that subject people to the experience of being morally wronged, whether or not their interests are damaged in specifi-able ways. Similarly, in terms of the approach to moral analysis that I pre-sented above, invasion of privacy, by violating people's autonomy, is inconsis-tent with respect for their dignity and hence a presumptive eause of harm. In evaluating consequences of this variety, we move away from a standard risk-benefit analysis toward an analysis related to the concept of individual rights. Thus, when we speak of the invasion of privacy as a moral wrong, we are postulating a correlative right—the right to privacy—that is being violated. Invasion of privacy, when known by subjects, also tends to create a certain degree of stress and discomfort. In this sense, too, it can be viewed as a harm in its own right. More importantly, however, the discomfort engendered by in-vasion of privacy may be a function of its *indirect* relationship to harm: Within a harm-benefit framework, invasion of privacy is troubling primarily because it subjects the individual to the *possibility* of harm. Privacy provides people with some protection against harmful or unpleasant experiences—against punish-ment and exploitation by others, against embarrassment or lowered self-esteem, against threats to the integrity and autonomy of the self. Invasions of privacy inerease the likelihood of harm because they deprive the individual of that protection.

Turning to the third row of table 2.1, we can link informed consent and deception to a harm-benefit framework in three ways: deception and curtail-ments of informed consent can be viewed as harms in their own right, as multipliers of harms due to other causes, and as conditions that subject re-search participants to the possibility of harm. Deception refers to any deliberate misrepresentation of the purposes of the research, of the identity or qualifications of the investigator, of the auspices under which the research is conducted, of the experiences to which participants will be subjected, or of the likely uses and consequences of the research. Deception curtails the partici-pants' opportunities to give informed consent insofar as it deprives them of information that might be material to their decision to participate. Withhold-ing of potentially relevant information—even in the absence of active decep-tion (in the sense of misrepresentation)—would also constitute a violation of the requirement of informed consent. Furthermore, informed consent is compromised insofar as the individual's freedom to agree to or refuse participation is limited—whether it be through outright coercion or undue pres-sure, through threats of punishment or the offering of irresistible inducements.

When viewed as harms in their own right, deception and violation of informed consent—like invasion of privacy—belong in the category of "moral wrongs" or deprivations of dignity. Whether or not individuals suffer specifi-able damage as a result of these procedures, they are wronged in the sense that their basic rights to the truth and to freedom of choice are violated. Deception and coercion can also be viewed as multipliers of harms due to other causes. In the calculation of the risk-benefit ratio for a stressful psychological experi-ment, for example, the injury or discomfort resulting from participation would be multiplied if participants were misled about the nature of the experiment or unduly pressured to take part in it and therefore prevented from making an informed, voluntary decision about whether or not to subject themselves to a potentially stressful experience. Finally, deception and coercion—again, like invasion of privacy—are linked to a harm-benefit framework in that they are conditions that subject the individual to the *possibility* of harm. The norms of truthfulness and informed consent afford us some protection against harmful or unpleasant experiences by enhancing our ability to make decisions in line with our interests, preferences, and values. They do so by providing the opportuni-ties and the tools for making such decisions, and by maintaining an atmo-sphere of predictability, trust, and mutual respect, in which such decisions can be made. Deception and violations of informed consent increase the likelihood of harm because they reduce research participants' ability to protect them-selves against it.

In sum, the issues of privaey and informed consent can both be addressed within a harm-benefit framework. Not only can invasions of privacy and viola-tions of informed consent be viewed as harms in their own right, but—most important for a risk-benefit analysis—they constitute conditions that subject research participants to the possibility of various other harms. Nevertheless, there are some advantages in treating these two issue areas as separate

categories. First, they highlight concerns that are of critical importance to the protection of research participants in general—concerns reflected in the regulation of confidentiality and informed consent. Concerns in these two issue areas are particularly likely to be aroused by certain methods of social research, which—in the interest of enhancing the validity of the data—are especially intrusive in nature or rely on deceiving participants about the purpose (or even the occurrence) of the research. Second, separating out these two issues suggests an additional procedure, complementary to risk-benefit analysis, for arriving at ethical decisions: a procedure based on the specification of rights, including the right to privacy and the right to all material information and to freedom of choice. Thus, separate consideration of the issues of privacy and deception is useful, despite the inevitable overlaps, precisely because these issues bridge two approaches to ethical decision making, one based on calculation of risks and benefits and the other based on protection of rights.

Cutting across the four issue areas is a distinction between three types of impact that social research may have, each of which is a potential source of ethical concern (see the columns of table 2.1): the impact on the concrete interests of research participants, on the quality of the interpersonal relationships between investigators and participants, and on wider social values. The distinction is conceptually linked to distinctions that I have made in my earlier work among three processes of social influence (compliance, identification, and internalization) and three types of orientation to social systems (rule, role, and value orientation).[16]

The first column of table 2.1 refers to the possible impact of social research on the concrete interests of research participants. The concern here is that participation in the research may work to the disadvantage of the individuals involved, leaving them worse off at the end of the experience than they were at the beginning. In other words, the research may entail risks of injuries—physical, psychological, or material—that are of a relatively enduring nature. Involved here is more than momentary stress or discomfort, but a lasting damage to the individual's interests. The risk of such injuries may stem from the research procedures themselves (e.g., ingestion of potentially harmful drugs or confrontation with potentially disturbing revelations about one's self) or it may stem from the research findings (e.g., data showing inefficiencies in work organization that may lead to layoffs of some workers, or data on family organization that may lead to cuts in welfare payments). In some cases, risks are created or magnified by public exposure of information obtained from research participants; that is, the interests of participants are jeopardized if the information is widely disseminated or revealed to certain specific individuals or agencies. Risks of injury—and ethical concerns about such risks—are generally increased when the norm of informed consent is in any way violated or sidestepped, since research participants are then deprived of the full opportunity to protect their own interests.

Questions about the impact of social research on the interests of participants become more complex when we consider the interests, not only of the

individual participants, but also of the groups from which they are drawn. This immediately calls attention to the impact of the products of social research, in addition to the impact of the processes of research themselves. Much of the thinking about research ethics—particularly the logic behind the regulatory approach to research with human subjects—is predicated on the assumption that one is dealing with specific effects on identifiable individuals. The model is taken from the type of biomedical research in which injection of certain substances or performance of certain procedures exposes research participants to the risk of disease or other injury. This model is insufficient even for biomedical research, which may well have an impact on the interests of specific groups within the population, such as research on genetic diseases that disproportionately affect certain ethnic groups, or research on environmental hazards that affect certain regions and occupations. It is clearly insufficient for social research, which often focuses on group differences and has implications for social policy.

The very conduct of social research, and particularly its findings, may adversely affect the interests of some groups within the population—typically those who are already most vulnerable. Research suggesting that the performance of individuals from minority groups or lower social classes compares unfavorably with that of the majority or middle-class participants (perhaps—though not necessarily—because of biases in measurement or interpretation) may serve as a basis for practices or policies that place these groups at a distinct disadvantage. Thus, in considering the impact of a piece of research on the concrete interests of the participants, it is necessary to take group interests into account—to project the possible harms that may accrue to the group, to assure adequate protection of the group in the dissemination and use of the findings, and to assess effects on the group as part of the process of informed consent. The issues here are far more complex than those relating to the impact of the research on the specific individual who provides the data: Effects on the group are more remote and harder to predict; confidentiality of group data cannot readily be preserved; and there is no obvious way of determining who speaks for the group in giving informed consent. These issues go beyond the impact of the research on the specific individuals involved and are, to some extent, within the domain of the third column of table 2.1—the impact of the research on wider social values—to be discussed below.

The second column of table 2.1 refers to the possible impact of research procedures on the quality of the interpersonal relationship between investigators and participants. There is general consensus—to a large extent universally shared—about the way in which people ought to deal with each other in a variety of interaction contexts. In a professional relationship, which can serve as a model for interaction between investigators and research participants, it is expected that each party will show concern for the other's welfare and that they will treat each other with dignity and respect. Each tries to be helpful to the other and to avoid actions that might cause the other stress or discomfort. They are careful not to insult, degrade, coerce, exploit, frighten, or shock each other.

They make every effort to protect each other from humiliation and embarrass-ment, from feelings of pressure or hurt. To this end, we generally accept the way in which others present themselves and we try not to be overly inquisitive or intrusive, leaving others adequate room for maneuver. One of the guiding principles of a respectful relationship is honesty and candor about our own purposes and intentions. Another is reciprocity in both obligations and benefits. Social research engenders concerns insofar as it violates these standards for good interpersonal relations. Such concerns are aroused by procedures that subject research participants to discomfort, embarrassment, or other forms of stress; that deliberately deprive them of control over their self-presentation; or that involve deception or undue pressure.

The second column differs from the first in that it does not refer to long-term damages to the participant's interests. Rather, it encompasses experiences that are largley confined to the research situation itself—experiences of temporary stress or of wrongful treatment, without any measurable effect on the partici-pant's well-being beyond this situation. Of course, there is always the possibility that such experiences may leave a residue that influences the person's future relationships. The experience of being humiliated, deceived, or coerced may lead to a lowering of the person's self-esteem or a wariness about interpersonal relationships that carries over into subsequent situations. In such cases, we could properly speak of damage to the person's concrete interests in the form of a psychological injury. But even when the psychological impact is only temporary, a sacrifice in the quality of interpersonal relationships is not devoid of ethical significance. First, respect for human dignity ought to be treated as though it were an end in itself, quite apart from any particular consequences. I base this requirement on the view that depriving others of dignity leads to a presumptive decline in their well-being, even in the absence of calculable damage to their interests. Second, social research cannot be isolated from the rest of social life, particularly as it becomes more wide-spread and thus enters into the lives of a large number of people on a large number of occasions. Thus, any lowering in the quality of interpersonal rela-tionships in research situations has a wider effect on the quality of life through-out the society.

Finally, the behavior of social scientists within their research situations has implications for the role of social science in the society. When social scientists violate the norms of good interpersonal relationships, they contribute to forces of exploitation, deception, coercion, and intrusion that are already at work. Moreover, the conditions under which the data are collected may affect the nature of the findings; thus, research procedures that rely heavily on manipula-tion of the participants may reinforce a manipulative conception of human relations and organizational functioning.[17] The impact of social research pro-cedures on the quality of interpersonal relationships, therefore, raises ques-tions about the larger social impact of social science. This concern, as well as the concern about the spread of effects from the research situation (as one type

of interaction situation in our society) to the general quality of life in our society, brings us directly to the kinds of issues that are the focus for the third column of table 2.1.

The third column refers to the potential impact of social research on wider social values. The procedures and the products of social research—and indeed the prevalence or even the very existence of certain lines of research—may affect social values in a variety of ways. Social research may help to create, reinforce, and legitimize certain values within the society—and, conversely, to undermine and delegitimize other values. It may have an effect on the social atmosphere in which we live, contributing to the development of general moods and expectations. It may influence patterns of interpersonal relations, the functioning of various social institutions, the shape of political and economic processes. It may affect the relationships between different groups within the society and the satisfaction of their separate and competing needs. It may contribute to the relative emphasis given within the society to diverse and often conflicting social goals. Concern is aroused here by the possibility that social research may thus have a deleterious impact on important values of the society. Judgments of this impact are likely to differ among different analysts, not only because they may make different predictions about the probable consequences of various procedures or findings, but also because they may differ in their value preferences or in the priorities they assign to them. Thus, it is entirely possible that a type of research considered socially harmful by some will be deemed beneficial by others.

The third column differs from the other two in that it does not focus on the direct impact of the research on the individuals who participate in it or even on the groups from which they are selected, but on its impact on the society at large. The concern here is, essentially, with diffuse harm to the entire body politic.[18] However, the way individuals—or groups—are treated in the process of collecting the data and disseminating the findings is an important source of the diffuse harm that research may cause to wider social values. For example, research procedures that systematically deceive participants, subject them to undue pressure, or intrude on their privacy may result in the weakening of such social values as trust and personal autonomy. Research that exploits relatively powerless and vulnerable groups, whose members find it difficult to refuse participation, and that disseminates findings in a way that may place such groups at a disadvantage, may have a deleterious effect on the values of equity and social justice. Other potential sources of diffuse harm are the products of social research—i.e., some of its specific findings. For example, research that suggests genetic differences in intelligence between different racial groups may undermine societal efforts to promote equal opportunities in education and employment.[19]

Finally, the prevalence or even the very existence of certain lines of research may itself constitute a source of diffuse harms to important social values. For example, opinion polls that focus on the intentions of the voters

over the course of an election campaign may distort the political process, for the poll results themselves may become major determinants of the behavior of both citizens and candidates.[20] To take a different example, the prevalence of field experiments on helping behavior may have the effect of reducing such behavior by providing an additional justification for bystanders' failure to intervene in a crisis situation on the grounds that it is probably just another experiment. Proponents, of course, can cite countervailing social benefits that might accrue from both of these lines of research, but the examples illustrate the possibilities of diffuse harm that must be taken into account.

In sum, the columns of table 2.1 distinguish three types of impact of social research that bring three distinct (though interrelated) sets of ethical concerns to the fore. These ethical concerns, in turn, reflect general social concerns about the functioning of any profession that is recognized and supported within a society: How are the competing interests of the professionals and their publics to be balanced and reconciled? How are standards of professional conduct, consistent with the social norms that govern interpersonal relations, to be established and maintained? And, how are basic social values to be enhanced and protected by the role the profession occupies and the ways it functions within the society? With these general concerns in mind, I shall proceed to examine the implications of the three types of impact distinguished by the columns of table 2.1 for each of the four issue areas defined by the four rows. For the first three rows, these implications follow directly from the descriptions of these three rows, as well as of the three columns, that have already been given. From my summary and elaboration of the three-way distinction as it applies to each of these three rows, I shall then draw further implications for the fourth row, proposing the form of social control that seems most appropriate in response to each of the three types of ethical concern.

Harms and Benefits

From a harm-benefit perspective, the three columns simply represent a classification of three types of harm that might result from social research (or, indeed, any research with human participants). For each of these types of harm, one can also cite a corresponding type of benefit. There is no assumption, however, that the justification for a particular study depends on the separate harm-benefit ratios for each column. For example, there could be a justification for risking harms of the first or second type if the potential benefits of the third type were sufficiently great. On the other hand, a favorable risk-benefit ratio—within a column or across columns—would not automatically justify a study because, as has already been noted, certain kinds and degrees of harm cannot legitimately be risked, no matter how great the potential benefits might be.

The three types of harm have already been defined above, in the discussion of the columns of table 2.1, and they will only be summarized here with some further elaboration.

Injury

Research may cause damage to the concrete interests of the participants or of the groups from which they are drawn in the form of relatively enduring physical, psychological, or material injuries.[21] Physical injuries in social research could conceivably occur if the research procedures generated violent reactions among participants themselves, if the research findings caused others to direct violence against the participants or their groups, or if participation in the research subjected people to penalties from authorities or revenge from adversaries. Physical injuries could also occur in studies involving the use of drugs or alcohol, various forms of deprivation, or exposure to the elements.[22] Psychological injuries could take the form of psychotic reactions in vulnerable individuals, as a result of stress, anxiety, painful self-discovery, or rejection experienced in the course of the research. They may also take the form of experimentally induced losses in self-esteem or self-confidence, which persist beyond the research situation.[23] Material injuries may take the form of losses in certain resources or opportunities as a result of participation in the research—for example, by those who receive the "less desirable" treatment in educational, criminal-justice, or large-scale social experiments. The findings of social research may also have a deleterious effect on the material well-being of research participants, since they could lead to changes in policy with negative consequences for their incomes, fringe benefits, working conditions, or living conditions. It is the findings of research that represent the most obvious risks of damage to group interests. Thus, research findings on group differences in intelligence could cause injury to disadvantaged groups—both materially, through their effects on social policy, and psychologically, through their effects on the groups' reputation and self-esteem.

Corresponding to these different kinds of potential injuries, there are various ways in which social research may produce concrete benefits to the interests of participants and their groups. Such benefits may take the form of financial remuneration, special services, improvements in health and psychological well-being, and access to material resources and opportunities. Similarly, the findings of social research may advance the concrete interests of the participants as well as their groups, through their effects on organizational practices, social policy, and public understanding.

Stress and Indignity

Research may cause stress and indignity to the participants within the research situation. While such experiences may not constitute long-term harms to their interests, they do represent violations of the standards of good interpersonal relations. Stress may take the form of specific fears or general anxiety, physical or interpersonal discomfort, feelings of inadequacy or uncertainty, embarrassment, frustration, or internal conflict. Research participants may, for example, experience discomfort, embarrassment, and a sense of inadequacy because they do not know how to handle the situation in which

they find themselves or because they believe—sometimes because they have been deliberately led to believe—that they are not performing well. These typically are temporary, situational reactions, although the line between short-term and long-term effects cannot always be sharply drawn. As has already been noted, the self-doubts and lowered self-esteem induced in such situations may at times—depending on the characteristics of the individuals involved and the nature of the precipitating experience—carry over into future situations; short-term stress and discomfort would, in these cases, shade into psychological injury. Even when the stress is only temporary, it does constitute a harm: Clearly the accumulation of stressful experiences represents a lowering in the quality of a person's life, even though the harm contributed by any single stressful experience—because of its short-term nature—cannot be easily calculated for purposes of risk-benefit analysis.[24]

Research participation may also produce situational effects that are less palpable and more elusive than stress or discomfort and hence even more difficult to enter into risk-benefit calculations. These can best be described as indignity—i.e., being subjected to an experience that is degrading and that deprives the person of the respect with which we generally treat fellow humans. Such experiences may arise, for example, when research procedures cause people to lose control over their reactions, to violate their own values, or to appear foolish, or—more generally—when they employ deception and psychological manipulation. Perhaps the limiting case of short-term harm, involving at least a mild form of indignity, is the imposition that results from taking up people's time in an activity that they find useless and lacking in interest. Though the relationship between investigator and participant in this case may be free of stress and degradation, it lacks reciprocity in that it serves the interests of the investigator but provides no benefits to the participants commensurate with the time they are asked to invest. Again, it should be noted that indignities constitute harms—in the form of insults, rather than injuries. While it may not be possible to demonstrate the damaging effect of any single instance of indignity, the accumulation of such indignities (whether or not they are experienced as stressful) is likely to lower the person's self-esteem, self-confidence, and capacity for autonomous action.

Corresponding to the different kinds of short-term harms that have been described, there are potential benefits to participants resulting from their involvement in an experience that may be enjoyable, interesting, or instructive, and may enhance their self-esteem. The latter effect is likely to the extent participants are treated with respect, assured that they are participating in an important enterprise, and made to feel that their personal contribution to the enterprise is valuable and appreciated.

Diffuse Harm

Research may cause diffuse harm which does not directly affect the individual participants or even the groups from which they are drawn, but which is damaging to the society at large. Such damage may take the form of reducing the integrity and effectiveness of social institutions in achieving societal goals and values, or of creating an atmosphere—a set of beliefs and expectations—antagonistic to important and widely shared social values. A prime example, already mentioned, is the perversion of the political process that might result from the excessive use of opinion polling in election campaigns. Under the guise of assessing the views of voters, polls may actually shape the preferences of voters; consequently, the activities of candidates may in turn be geared to raising their standing in the polls rather than to addressing the issues. Disproportionate and sometimes exploitative use of minority group members as research participants and dissemination of data about group differences in ability and achievement may increase the level of inequity in the society and undermine efforts to enhance equality of opportunity. The value of equity may also be compromised by social experiments—e.g., in housing, income maintenance, or the administration of criminal justice—in which certain advantages are differentially allocated to different segments of the population. The prevalence of field experiments on helping behavior, mentioned above, in which experimental confederates feign injury or other kinds of disability in order to observe bystander reactions under varying circumstances,[25] may add to the level of arbitrariness and irrationality within society and compound the ambiguity of real-life situations that call for bystander intervention. These and other types of social research that are intrusive or deceptive may also cause diffuse harm by reducing the private space and the level of trust in the society—effects to which I shall return momentarily.

Corresponding to the different kinds of diffuse harms that have been described, there are potential benefits that social research may bring to the larger society. Research advances the development of scientific knowledge, which is a social value in its own right, and which, in turn, may contribute to social welfare and public enlightenment. Increased understanding of human behavior and social institutions may both directly enhance the quality of life and contribute to the solution of social problems, to the effectiveness of institutional functioning, and to the development of sound and just social policies.

Privacy and Confidentiality

For the issue of privacy and confidentiality, the three columns of table 2.1 correspond to three types of concerns about invasion of privacy that social research brings into play.[26] In each case, invasion of privacy can be viewed both as a harm in its own right, particularly in the sense of a moral wrong, and as a condition that subjects people to the possibility of harm by depriving them of the protection that privacy offers. However, as we move from the first to the third column, the emphasis shifts somewhat from invasion of privacy as exposure to the risk of specific harms to invasion of privacy as violation of a basic right.

Public Exposure

An obvious source of concern about the potential invasiveness of social research is the fear that information revealed by participants in the course of the research may be disseminated beyond the research setting itself. Such wider public exposure of the participants' views or actions may subject them to the possibility of damaging consequences. Research participants may be concerned, for example, that the information might become accessible to authorities who are in a position to penalize or harass them. Individuals engaged in illegal activities, welfare recipients whose private lives are always subject to scrutiny, or political dissidents in a repressive environment are among those who are particularly likely to feel such anxieties. Participants may also be concerned that the information might become accessible to specific others in their daily environments, particularly their superiors in a status hierarchy (such as their bosses, teachers, parents, officers, or keepers), who might retaliate against them if they disapproved of their opinions or actions. Potentially damaging consequences of public exposure include not only the risk of penalty or reprisal, but also the possibility of embarrassment and disapproval, affecting people's reputations and relations with their associates.

Concern about public exposure may also extend to group data. For example, information about the performance or attitudes of a particular unit within an organization or community may subject its members to possibly damaging or embarrassing consequences, even if the responses of individual participants are not identified. Similarly, information about the practices of an organization, institution, or community may have deleterious effects on its reputation and the resources it can command. Sometimes, of course, research is specifically designed to increase public knowledge about the practices of an organization (or type of organization) and to evaluate its performance. In such cases, public exposure does not present an ethical problem, unless respondents were misled about the way in which the data were to be used, or unless observations were made covertly, as in David L. Rosenhan's pseudopatient studies in which the investigators gained admission to psychiatric hospitals by pretending to have heard voices.[11] Public exposure of group data may also be an issue in studies of ethnic minority communities or foreign societies, carried out by outsiders with insufficient understanding of the cultural context. Members of these groups may view the dissemination of information obtained in such studies as invasive of their group's privacy, with the consequence of reinforcing negative stereotypes about them and justifying policies that are irrelevant or detrimental to their interests.

At the level of the individual, the risks of public exposure can be virtually eliminated by spelling out precise procedures for maintaining confidentiality of the data and scrupulously adhering to them (as Robert F. Boruch discusses in this volume). In most cases, it is even possible to protect confidential data against involuntary exposure (resulting, for example, from forced entry or court orders) by removing identifying information as soon as possible. Maintaining the confidentiality of group data is far more complex. Even when research reports attempt to disguise the identity of an organization or community or of its subgroups, it is often impossible to prevent recognition by many readers. In studies focusing on large groupings (such as ethnic minorities) or on entire societies, disguising the identity of the population is generally both impossible and inconsistent with the purposes of the research. In the case of group data, then, the main issue shifts from maintaining confidentiality to introducing safeguards—in the choice of research topics, the design and procedures of the research, the solicitation of the participants, and the reporting of the findings—to assure that the group's interests will be maximally protected against potentially harmful consequences of public exposure.[28]

Reduced Control over Self-Presentation

A second source of concern about the potential invasiveness of social research is that it may reduce participants' control over their self-presentation in the research situation proper. Self-presentation and impression management are central preoccupations in most of our interpersonal relationships.[29] Efforts to control our self-presentation are partly designed to protect ourselves against humiliation, embarrassment, disapproval, and rejection. According to the norms that govern social interaction, people generally accept and support the identity that others seek to project and respect the others' desire to maintain control over their self-presentations. To maintain this control, they must be free to pick and choose what information about themselves to disclose and what information to withhold. There are a number of ways in which the structure of the research situation and the procedures of social research may have the effect of restricting this freedom, thereby reducing participants' privacy. Research participants lose a measure of control over their self-presentation to the extent they are unaware of the conditions under which they are being observed—because they do not know that they are being observed at all, or who it is that is observing them, or what aspects of their behavior are the focus of observation. Control over self-presentation is also reduced to the extent that participants feel under pressure to reveal personal information that they would prefer to withhold. Finally, control over self-presentation is reduced to the extent participants are caught unawares, being confronted by an unexpected or disturbing event or a violation of social norms.

Confrontation with such circumstances, which reduce people's control over their self-presentation, is not unique to social research situations, but is a common feature of everyday life. It is one of the risks we take whenever we venture out into the public arena and engage in social interaction. Even though the resulting reduction in control over our self-presentation is experienced as a loss in privacy, the events that cause it—whether in real life or in the research situation—do not in themselves constitute ethically objectionable invasions of

privacy. Serious ethical concerns arise only insofar as the reduced control over participants' self-presentation is brought about by deliberately deceptive, coercive, or intrusive means.[10] The problem is that social research, in at least some of its manifestations, is prone to employ precisely such questionable means in its quest for valid, spontaneous reactions from respondents. There is often an inherent tension between the participants' desire to maintain control over their self-presentations and the investigator's goal to obtain accurate information about their motives, attitudes, behavior patterns, or personal histories, which may require circumventing their efforts at control and penetrating their facades. For example, unobtrusive measurement and experimental deception are specifically designed to counteract respondents' tendencies to manipulate their self-presentations by keeping them unaware of the behavior being observed. Thus, the issues raised by the second source of concern over privacy are more difficult than those relating to public exposure. We are dealing not merely with the introduction of safeguards to minimize threats to privacy (by protecting confidentiality of data), but with the question of the inherent invasiveness, and hence the ethical propriety, of certain research procedures that social scientists consider essential to the methodological soundness of their work.

Reduction of Private Space

The third source of concern about the potential invasiveness of social research is that it may reduce the overall amount of private space available to individuals. Private space protects the integrity and autonomy of the self. Preservation of the sense of an autonomous self depends on maintaining a recognized boundary between self and environment, which assures the individual a private space, both physical and psychological. Violations of this space—what Erving Goffman has called "contaminative exposure"[11]—threaten our capacity to develop an autonomous self and to maintain its integrity. The definitions of the boundaries of private space differ across individuals and across cultures, but it generally includes our own bodies and personal possessions, our intimate relationships, biographical facts, and personal thoughts. Societies develop and maintain social norms designed to minimize personal and institutional actions that overstep these boundaries. The inviolability of private space as a social value, however, often comes into conflict with the functioning of various social institutions in the pursuit of other social values—such as the functioning of a free press, of the criminal justice system, of consumer credit systems, or of airport security systems.

Social research is one societal enterprise that, by its nature, comes into conflict with the value of preserving an optimal amount of private space within the society. Some of the controversies about intrusive research have centered on studies that involve direct observations of behavior that is quintessentially private (even though it may occur in semipublic places)—such as Laud Humphreys's study of male homosexual activities in public restrooms[12] or the

R. Dennis Middlemist et al. study of micturition.[13] Critics of these studies have focused on the surreptitious nature of the observations and the fact that they were obtained without informed consent—procedures that are generally troublesome, but become more so when used to gain access into people's private space.[14] The problems of balancing the social values represented by social research with the value of preserving private space are more fundamental, however, than these more dramatic examples would suggest. Significant research on human behavior and social institutions inevitably must inquire into matters that at least some individuals, some groups, or some societies place within the boundaries of private space—such as love, personal health, death, religion, ethnicity, politics, money, or family relations. To declare such topics categorically off limits to social science would trivialize the enterprise and greatly reduce its potential benefits to human welfare. While no topic ought to be considered taboo for social investigation, social controls are essential to assure care and sensitivity in the choice of occasions and procedures for investigating areas that might constitute part of private space for the individual, group, or society involved.

Informed Consent and Deception

When applied to the issue of deception and informed consent, the three-way distinction reflected in the columns of table 2.1 corresponds to three types of concerns generated by the use of deception and by violations of informed consent in social research. I shall use the term *pressure* as a shorthand designation of the various ways in which an individual's freedom of choice in the situation may be curtailed. At the extreme, this refers to the use of coercion or direct threats of punishment to induce participation in the research. Less extreme forms of pressure include efforts to induce participation by indicating that powerful authorities expect it, by offering irresistible rewards, by implying that failure to participate would result in penalties or place the individual in a bad light, by putting the individual on the defensive, or by identifying refusal with a lack of courage, courtesy, or patriotism. Both deception and pressure may occur at the point at which participation in the research is solicited, where they have a direct impact on the individual's capacity to give voluntary, informed consent. They may also occur at different points throughout the research process itself. For example, participants may be misled about various features of the situation or given false information about their performance; and they may be pressured to reveal information that they would prefer to withhold, or to engage in activities they would prefer to avoid, or to continue in the research when they would prefer to quit.

Impaired Capacity for Decision Making

One reason for concern about pressure and deception is that they impair participants' capacity to make voluntary, informed decisions in line with their

own interests. Decisions about participating in the research at all, about continuing participation, about cooperating with certain of the activities or procedures involved in the research, and about revealing certain kinds of information may all have a bearing on the concrete interests of the participants. Insofar as they are subjected to pressure or coercion, they are denied the opportunity to weigh these considerations and decide accordingly. Insofar as they are subjected to deception or misrepresentation, they are denied information that may be material to the decisions they have to make. As a consequence, their ability to protect themselves against possible injury is restricted.

The problems in this category are not completely resolved by full disclosure and mechanical adherence to the principle of informed consent. Full disclosure of the purposes and conditions of the research may provide information that is not material to participants' interests and the decisions they have to make, while adversely affecting the validity of the findings. Voluntary, informed consent is illusory if the participants lack the capacity to evaluate the information given (e.g., because of age, intelligence, or mental and physical state) or if they are in a highly coercive environment (such as prison). The primary concern is that participants have all the opportunity and information that they need and that they can utilize for making decisions and protecting their own interests.

An added element of complexity is introduced when we consider the effects of deception and pressure on participants' capacity to protect the interests of the groups to which they belong. The problem takes on special urgency when we remember that the groups whose interests are most likely to be affected by social research—groups characterized by disadvantage, dependence, deviance, or captive status—are also the groups that are most subject to pressures and least able to resist demands to participate in research.[35] When group interests are at stake, therefore, it is particularly important to avoid procedures that would further impair research participants' capacity to make voluntary, informed decisions. Given the difficulty in predicting the probable consequences of a piece of research (including its products) for the interests of the group, it may often be useful to bring representatives of the group's leadership into the decision-making process. This would lessen the individual participants' burden of deciding what is or is not in the best interest of their groups, although it might also subject them to an additional set of pressures coming from their own (perhaps self-appointed) group leaders.

Deprivation of Respect

A second reason for concern about deception and pressure is that they deprive participants of the respect to which fellow humans are entitled as a basic assumption of decent interpersonal relations. By deliberately misrepresenting their own purposes and intentions and by restricting participants' choices through manipulative and coercive means, investigators are violating

some of the guiding principles on which a respectful relationship rests. The resulting relationship is marked by a lack of reciprocity in obligations and outcomes, which is tantamount to the use of others as means rather than as ends in themselves.

This concern is independent of the possibility that deception and pressure may expose research participants to specifiable harmful consequences. Even if they suffer no injury or even temporary discomfort (except for the discomfort that generally accompanies the experience of being pressured), they have been subjected to a moral wrong. Their right to respectful treatment, including associated rights to candor, to freedom of choice, and to reciprocity, have been violated. Violation of these rights subjects people to the possibility of harm in the long run. The principle of mutual respect and the rights associated with it provide a set of social norms and an interpersonal atmosphere that help to protect individuals from injurious and stressful interactions. Systematic violations of these norms undermine the principle of respect and create an atmosphere in which disregard for the well-being of participants is legitimized and their vulnerability to harm is heightened.

Erosion of Trust

A third reason for concern about the use of deception and pressure in social research is the cumulative effect that such procedures have on the integrity of certain social values. Specifically, by the systematic use of deception and pressure, social research may contribute to the erosion of trust in social institutions and interpersonal relations. Extensive reliance on deception and manipulation by various institutions in our society—including government, business, the professions, and the media—has already created widespread distrust in social institutions. Concomitants of this distrust are a cynical attitude and a sense of anomie. The message seems to be that deception and manipulation are expectable and hence acceptable as long as you manage to avoid being caught; in any event, you would be wise to assume that people, particularly those in authority positions, cannot be trusted or believed. It is especially troublesome when social scientists contribute to this message, since they implicitly lend their own professional authority to the view that such behavior is an inevitable feature of human nature and social relations.

Trust is an important social value in its own right, basic to our conception of desirable relationships among people generally, as well as between citizens and authorities. It is also of great instrumental significance, in that trust is a condition for the legitimacy and effectiveness of social institutions and for the smoothness and reliability of social interaction. Trust provides the sense of security and predictability that allows us to plan and arrange our activities so as to maximize our values and protect our interests. Thus, the erosion of trust within the society or any of its component institutions subjects us to the possibility of harm by undermining our ability to protect ourselves against it.

Social Control

The term *social control* is used loosely here to refer to the entire range of processes and mechanisms employed by a society through its various agencies to prescribe, guide, monitor, and restrain the behavior of its members—for present purposes, the ethical conduct of social scientists. The concerns aroused by each of the three types of impact mapped in table 2.1 call for some kind of social control. What I am proposing, however, is that the most appropriate form of social control varies from column to column, depending on the particular nature of the problem we are confronting. Specifically, I maintain that government regulation becomes less appropriate as one moves from concerns about the concrete interests of research participants to concerns about the quality of interpersonal relationships and wider social values (which affect more ephemeral and remote interests).

Government Regulation

When our concern focuses on the impact of research on the concrete interests of the research participants, government regulation is probably the most appropriate form of social control, although it should not be seen as a substitute for the development of professional standards and broader social policies to protect the interests of participants. A good example of government involvement in social control is the system of Institutional Review Boards, with its associated regulations and procedures, established by the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (now Health and Human Services) in recent years. The primary purpose of government regulation is to protect research participants from palpable injuries, such as physical harm, psychological breakdown, or financial loss. To this end, regulatory mechanisms are designed to ensure that research studies do not expose participants to undue risks of injury; that the confidentiality of data is protected, so that injuries resulting from public exposure can be avoided; and that informed consent procedures are adhered to, so that participants are in a position to protect themselves against injury.

The role of government in protecting citizens against palpable injuries (through such diverse agencies as the police, the courts, and the regulatory commissions) is well established. Introducing government regulation, backed by the government's coercive power, into the research process can thus be justified when one is dealing with the risk of harms that are enduring, direct, and measurable—that is, injuries comparable to those for which one might claim damages in court. Historically, government intervention in research with human subjects began in the United States with the revelation of abuses in certain biomedical studies, which placed patients at serious risk to their health and perhaps even their survival, without adequate procedures for obtaining their informed consent. The involvement of government agencies can be attributed in part to the failure of professional associations and institutions to

do a satisfactory job of self-policing. But even if they had done so, total reliance on self-regulation by the profession does not seem appropriate in a situation that clearly involves conflicting interests between investigators and research participants. While the two parties do have some common interests, the research participants have a special interest in avoiding injury to themselves, and the investigators have a special interest in advancing their scientific work and their personal careers. Complete reliance on self-regulation, under these circumstances, would be tantamount to leaving the task of adjudicating competing interests to one of the interested parties. Thus, involvement of a third party—in the form of a public agency—is not only appropriate but clearly necessary where such conflicting interests are at issue.

Government regulation becomes more problematic when the concern focuses on group interests rather than the interests of individual participants; and when the concern is generated by the products of the research rather than by its processes. In these situations, it is considerably more difficult to predict the impact of the research (as it interacts with other social forces), to specify the nature of the injury that might result, and to identify the populations that are at risk. If government regulation is appropriate at all under these circumstances, it should apply only to special cases, in which important interests of particularly vulnerable groups are at stake, and it should set only very general guidelines (e.g., mandating that some type of consultation or "socioenvironmental impact study" be undertaken). In general, however, it would seem more appropriate to rely on the social policy process, rather than the regulatory process, for the protection of group interests in social research.

Professional Standards

When our concern focuses on the impact of social research on the quality of interpersonal relationships, without risk of significant injury, government regulation does not appear to be the appropriate form of social control. While it is possible to set out general criteria for the respectful, solicitous treatment of research participants, it is very difficult to translate them into specific requirements that can be enforced by an IRB (beyond such requirements as ensuring confidentiality and informed consent, which are designed to protect the participants' concrete interests, but of course also have a bearing on the quality of the relationship). Furthermore, violations of the norms that govern social interaction do not constitute palpable, demonstrable, enduring injuries of the kind that justify intervention by the government's regulatory apparatus with its coercive backing. Finally, maintaining the quality of interpersonal relationships with clients requires professional judgment, which is an essential ingredient of the professional role and an important criterion for professional certification. While government intervention may be necessary to protect clients from the consequences of gross violations of the norms of professional conduct (essentially, from malpractice), it would totally undermine the

professional role if it were aimed at regulating the details of the professional-client relationship.

To say that the quality of the relationship between investigator and research participant is not an appropriate subject for government regulation is not to imply that it should be entirely exempt from social control. Rather, in keeping with my view that the quality of the relationship with clients is a central feature of the professional role, I propose that this is precisely a domain in which professional standards must exercise the major control function. At the most formal level, professional standards for the treatment of research participants may be communicated in the form of ethical guidelines or codes adopted by professional associations, to serve an advisory or a binding function for their memberships. An excellent example of such an effort is the rather detailed document on ethics of research with human participants developed by the American Psychological Association.[36] Documents of this type contribute to social control by sensitizing the profession to the standards to which members are expected to adhere and introducing these standards into the training of new professionals. Often, professional associations may also develop mechanisms for enforcing their codified standards. For example, the ten general principles formulated by the American Psychological Association's Committee on Ethical Standards[37] were formally adopted by the association and incorporated in its code of ethics. Violations of the code can be the subject of formal charges brought against a member and can lead to various penalties, of which the most extreme is expulsion from the association.

The primary function of professional standards, however—whether or not they are formally codified—is not to serve as the basis for enforcement procedures, but to express the profession's consensus about the proper ways to enact the professional role. Professional standards governing the relationship of investigator and research participants are conveyed in professional training, in research supervision, in discussions at professional meetings, in debates in the literature, in special conferences and publications. Standards can be raised by introducing various practices that legitimize and institutionalize concern with ethical issues as part of the professional role—e.g., by including units on research ethics in the curriculum, by requiring a section on ethical considerations as a standard feature of research reports,[38] or by establishing committees and task forces devoted to these issues.[39] Professional standards (whether for the quality of scientific work or the quality of investigator-participant relationships) exercise social control by virtue of the effect that adherence to such standards has on the professional careers, reputations, and self-images of investigators.

Social Policy

When our concern focuses on the impact of social research on wider social values, government regulation again does not appear to be the appropriate

form of social control. We are dealing with the risk of diffuse harms to the body politic, rather than concrete injuries to identifiable individuals, whose interests government regulations are designed to protect. The consequences of research for social values are remote and hard to predict, and the links of existing social trends to earlier research activities (as distinct from other social forces) cannot readily be established. Not surprisingly, observers disagree in their speculations about the probable wider impact of certain lines of social research. Moreover, there is often disagreement about the desirability of certain anticipated consequences: Effects seen as harmful by some may be seen as beneficial by others. Under these circumstances, given the absence of a clear and present danger, the possible effect of government regulation on the integrity of social science itself becomes a particularly important consideration. Much of social research involves observation of ongoing events, interviewing, and the study of public records, and is thus more comparable to journalistic than to biomedical investigation.[40] Regulation of social research, therefore, can be seen as imposing constraints not only on the freedom of scientific inquiry, but also on freedom of speech and freedom of the press. Such constraints are hard to justify in a democratic society when their only purpose is to reduce the risk of diffuse harm.

To an important degree, reducing the risks of diffuse harm is the responsibility of the profession. Social scientists must consider the impact of their research on wider social values in the collection and dissemination of their data, as well as in their teaching and other professional activities. One of the functions of professional associations is to monitor the uses to which social science is put and to anticipate the long-term consequences of social research. Professional standards need to include norms regarding research sponsorship, the presentation of research findings, and follow-ups on completed research, all designed to minimize the possibilities of misinterpretation and misuse of the findings. But social controls in this domain cannot be left entirely to the profession itself. To a large extent, we are dealing here with the place of social science in the larger society, and this is of necessity a concern that engages the public interest.

Social control, under these circumstances, is most appropriately exercised through the processes by which social policy is formulated. These processes, in a democratic society, involve extensive public debate at different levels, in which social scientists—individually and through their organizations—must take an active part. By way of this debate, policies affecting the status of social science in the society are hammered out. This policy process yields decisions, for example, about the amount of public financial support that is to be given to social science and about its allocation to particular lines of research; about the extent to which social research (e.g., in the form of social experiments or evaluation studies) is to be commissioned or mandated in conjunction with the development of social programs; about the use of social science data in the implementation of social policies (such as school desegregation or court

reform); about the establishment of new research or training institutions in the social sciences (such as a National Peace Academy); or about the special rights, privileges, and protections that are to be extended to social scientists (such as the right to maintain the confidentiality of their sources). In the course of this policy process, which clearly represents an effective source of social control over social science, assessments of the impact of social research on wider social values legitimately play a central part. The debate, of course, must carefully balance the risks of diffuse harm created by certain types of social research against the potential benefits to the society, not only of the scientific knowledge to be produced, but also of maintaining a free, vigorous, independent social research enterprise.

Ethical Issues Confronting Different Research Methods

Within the framework presented in table 2.1, we can now look more specifically at the different methods used by social scientists. We can ask what impact each method is likely to have on the concrete interests of research participants, on the quality of the interpersonal relationships between investigators and participants, and on wider social values. Each of these types of impact will be examined in terms of the amount and kind of harm that is risked by a given method, the degree to which it threatens violations of privacy and confidentiality, and the degree to which it involves deception or other curtailments of informed consent. This examination will also suggest the major issues to which social controls need to be directed for each method.

For present purposes, I have divided the methods of social research into three broad categories that represent different ways in which the data are obtained: experimental manipulation, questioning of respondents, and direct observation. Each of these three categories, in turn, has (for the sake of symmetry) been further divided into three subcategories. The resulting nine types of research methods are listed in the left-hand column of table 2.2.

Within the category of experimental manipulation, the first subcategory that can be distinguished is the laboratory experiment. In controlled laboratory experiments, which are particularly popular among psychologists, the experimenter creates different psychological or social conditions by varying the definition of the situation, the experimental instructions, or the participants' activities or experiences in the situation, and observes the effects of these variations on the participants' behavior. I also include in this subcategory laboratory simulations in which participants are asked to play such real-life roles as those of national decision makers, business executives, or prison guards and inmates. Though such simulations are generally not controlled experiments, they do involve the deliberate staging of a set of events or experiences in order to study their effects on participants' behavior. A second use of experimental manipulation occurs in field experiments in which the experimenter—unbeknownst to the research participants—introduces ex-

TABLE 2.2
MAJOR ETHICAL ISSUES CONFRONTING DIFFERENT TYPES
OF SOCIAL RESEARCH

Types of Research	Types of Impact of the Research		
	Concrete Interests of Participants	Quality of Interpersonal Relationships	Wider Social Values
Experimental manipulation			
Laboratory experiments and simulations	Impaired capacity for decision making	Stress and indignity	Erosion of trust
Field experiments	Impaired capacity for decision making	Reduced control over self-presentation	Erosion of trust
Organizational and social experiments	Risk of material injury	Deprivation of respect	Inequity
Questioning of respondents			
Questionnaires and tests	Public exposure	Deprivation of respect	Inequity
Surveys and interview studies	Public exposure	Reduced control over self-presentation	Perversion of political process; manipulation
Records and secondary analysis	Public exposure	Deprivation of respect	Reduction of private space
Direct Observation			
Structured observation	Impaired capacity for decision making	Stress and indignity	Reduction of private space
Unobtrusive (public) observation	Impaired capacity for decision making	Reduced control over self-presentation	Reduction of private space
Participant observation	Public exposure	Deprivation of respect	Erosion of trust

perimental manipulations in a natural setting, as in the studies of helping behavior cited earlier. A very different type of field experiment, which I am including in the third category (with the designation "organizational experiment"), deliberately introduces alternative experimental treatments in an ongoing organization or group of organizations and compares their effects on various behavioral, attitudinal, or organizational dimensions. An extension of this type of research, also included in the third subcategory, is the large-scale social experiment, such as the New Jersey—Pennsylvania Income Maintenance Experiment, designed to evaluate new social policies by studying their effects on sample communities, each of which is selected to participate in one or another version of the program being tested or to serve as a control group."

The second category involves the questioning of respondents about their personal characteristics, life histories, experiences, interpersonal relations, attitudes, beliefs, values, fantasies, past behaviors, or behavioral intentions. This type of research may rely on written questionnaires and tests (of aptitude,

achievement, or personality), which have been used on a variety of populations for a variety of purposes—ranging from studies of child-rearing practices, as reported by school children, to studies of creativity in artists and scientists. The second subcategory of this type includes the sample survey, which is used in opinion polling, market research, and a wide variety of theoretical and applied studies, to assess the attitudes, expectations, or practices of a population through interviews with a representative sample of that population. I also include in this subcategory the use of personal interviews with special populations, as in studies of job satisfaction among workers in a particular factory, of inner conflicts among psychiatric patients, or of political attitudes among legislators. The third subcategory of "questioning" research includes the use of records—such as those kept in hospitals, schools or municipalities—as a source of data, and the secondary analysis of data collected in earlier surveys or questionnaire studies. The distinguishing feature of this subcategory is that the data consist of information obtained from (or about) respondents on an earlier occasion and for a different purpose.

Direct observation of ongoing behavior can be subdivided into structured, unobtrusive, and participant observation. In structured observation, the investigator assigns special tasks to research participants or arranges special interaction situations—such as group discussions or mother-child inter-actions—in a laboratory setting and then observes and records the participants' performance, usually in terms of a systematic set of behavioral categories. I would also include in this subcategory systematic observations carried out in relatively structured nonlaboratory situations—such as class-rooms, encounter or therapy groups, and conferences—in which the investigator is a nonparticipating observer. Unobtrusive observation refers to naturalistic study of ongoing behavior in public places, such as the play behavior of children, the interactions of strangers on trains or lovers in the park, and the reactions of crowds at football games or political demonstrations. In participant observation, used extensively by anthropologists and sociologists, the investigator studies a community, organization, institution, or social movement, by participating in its regular activities. Participant observers may in fact be members of the groups they are studying, or they may deliberately become members for the purposes of the research, or they may join the group temporarily as acknowledged outsiders.

My listing of the ethical issues that may arise in each of these types of research is not based on a systematic survey of studies in the genre and is certainly not intended to provide a statistical picture of prevailing practice. I will cite a problem for a given type of research whenever the logic of the methods it employs, or the context in which it is generally carried out, or the nature of the data it collects, creates the potential for that problem to arise. I will give special emphasis to a problem when there is evidence that it has manifested itself with relative frequency in the actual experience with this type of research. Thus, deception is presented as a major issue for laboratory and field experiments, since it flows from the logic of the method (i.e., the requirement of keeping participants unaware of the purpose of the experimental manipulation) and is rather widespread. For participant observation research, deception is presented as a less central issue because it is not as pervasive as in experimental research, even though disguise and misrepresentation have been used fairly often for methodological purposes (to gain entry into situations that might otherwise be inaccessible to the observer). By contrast, deception hardly arises as an issue at all with respect to survey research, because investigators working in that tradition have not had any systematic reason for its use, nor are there any indications that it has often appeared in practice. This does not mean that deception could never be used in survey research, or even that it could not, under different circumstances, become a standard procedure. Conversely, there is no implication that deception is a necessary component of laboratory or field experiments, or even that it is ubiquitous in current practice. It is important to remember that many lines of experimental research—and certainly of participant observation research—do not rely on deception at all. In short, citing a problem for a particular type of research does not suggest that certain abuses are inherent in its methods; omitting the problem for another type of research does not suggest that its methods are immune to these abuses.

Table 2.2 summarizes the major ethical issues posed by each of the nine types of research with respect to participant interests, interpersonal relationships, and wider social values. For each cell of the table, I make a judgment about the most important problem, choosing in each case between magnitude of potential harm, threat to privacy and confidentiality, and potential violation of informed consent. These choices are somewhat arbitrary, particularly since the three issue areas often overlap and interact. They are forced choices, whose main purpose is to make a tabular overview of major issues more manageable. A fuller statement of the problems associated with each type of research can be found in the text that follows.

Laboratory Experiments and Simulations

At the level of participant interests, the risk of physical injury becomes an issue only in those laboratory studies that involve pharmacological or physiological interventions. In studies involving strictly psychological or social interventions, there is the hypothetical possibility that experimentally induced aggression, for example, might expose participants to the risk of physical attack, but there is virtually no evidence that this problem has in fact arisen. A possible exception is the prison simulation study by Philip G. Zimbardo and associates, in which student participants became so involved in their roles that the "guards" actually began to subject the "inmates" to physical (in addition to psychological) abuse.[42] Shortly thereafter, however, the study was prematurely terminated. The risk of psychological injury is more

serious, although there is no evidence that participants in laboratory experiments have actually experienced psychotic reactions or long-term psychological damage. Yet, one cannot rule out the possibility that the self-doubts and lowered self-esteem that participants often experience, as a direct or indirect result of experimental manipulations, may endure beyond the laboratory situation. This issue is raised, for example, by several experiments in which college-age participants were given false information that created doubts about their sexual identities (although they were subsequently debriefed),[43] and by studies in which participants are induced to act in ways that violate their values and self-concepts, such as Stanley Milgram's well-known obedience experiments[44] or the Zimbardo et al. prison simulation.

Public exposure due to violations of confidentiality has not been an issue in laboratory experiments, largely because the information they obtain from individuals is quite esoteric and usually of no interest to anyone other than the experimenter. Impairment of the capacity for decision making, on the other hand, is a major issue—in fact, I am suggesting, *the* major issue when our *concern focuses on the concrete interests of research participants*—because of the heavy reliance on deception in this research tradition. While the risk of injury—even psychological injury—may be relatively small, participants have a right to decide for themselves whether or not they are prepared to take that risk, and deception may deprive them of the opportunity to do so. I would argue that, in the case of laboratory experiments, deception and other possible constraints on informed consent are the primary issues to which government regulations (and IRBs) need to address themselves. The use of deception *immediately raises the question whether the participants' capacity for decision making is impaired*—a question that takes on special importance in experiments that are stressful and experiments in which there is even a remote possibility of enduring psychological injury. Regulations are *necessary* to ensure that *participants have all the information and freedom they need to protect themselves against undue stress and possible injury*. For laboratory experiments involving only psychological and social intervention, regulations ensuring informed consent are probably also *sufficient* to provide the needed *protection*.

At the level of interpersonal relationships, the possibility of stress and indignity is a major issue for laboratory experiments. In many laboratory studies, the experimental manipulations are specifically designed to induce such stressful states as fear, anxiety, internal conflict, frustration, feelings of failure or inadequacy, embarrassment, confusion, or unpleasant interactions, in order to explore their behavioral consequences under different conditions. In other cases, participants may be subjected, over the course of the experiment, to experiences that are stressful or demeaning—for example, when they are induced to engage in actions that they and others consider unworthy.[45] Invasion of privacy is not a serious issue in laboratory studies, since participants know that they are under observation and can exercise some

control over their *self-presentations*. Control over self-presentation is reduced, however, to the extent that participants are deceived about the purposes of the experiment (which is precisely why experimenters often resort to deception) and to the extent that they are exposed to disturbing experiences or to *instructions that violate common expectations*. Deception and manipulation threaten the quality of the experimenter-participant relationship—even in the absence of acute stress—because they deprive participants of the respect to which they are entitled. I have listed stress and indignity as the major issues confronted by laboratory studies in the second column of table 2.2, since in effect they encompass the problems of deception and manipulation. Controls at this level call for continuing refinement of professional standards, in the search for alternative approaches that would meet the research objectives *without sacrificing participants' dignity*, for ways of mitigating deception and stress if they are to be used, and for *debriefing procedures* designed to alleviate stress and restore trust.

At the level of wider social values, the major concern generated by laboratory experiments is that, in their extensive reliance on deception and manipulation, they may be *contributing to the erosion of trust* in authorities and social institutions. As a further consequence, they may *reinforce an attitude of cynicism* and help to legitimize the practices of misinformation and manipulation within the society. These potential implications of research that uses deception are *appropriate subjects for policy debate*, to be considered in the context of other societal activities—such as politics, advertising, and news reporting—that may similarly contribute to the erosion of trust.

Field Experiments

The profile for field experiments is similar to that for laboratory experiments, with some differences in emphasis. At the level of participant interests, the *risk of injury is negligible* in those experiments that involve the introduction of only minor variations in an *ongoing public activity* (e.g., variations in the race, sex, appearance, or attire of individuals collecting signatures for a petition). When the manipulation involves the staging of an unusual, disturbing event, there is the hypothetical, but far-fetched, possibility of physical injury (e.g., if somehow a melee were precipitated). More realistic is the possibility of psychological injury; for example, unwitting research participants confronted with a feigned accident might be deeply shocked, or might *experience losses in self-esteem* because they found themselves incompetent or unwilling to help. Even in such disturbing situations, however, the likelihood of enduring psychological harm is rather low. The experience is more likely to produce temporary effects, though it may cause considerable inconvenience, annoyance, and conflict.[46] The possibility of material injury may arise in field experiments in which the manipulation has differential effects on the participants in a real-life setting. For example, in the *Robert*

Rosenthal-Lenore Jacobson study of self-fulfilling prophecies,[47] teachers were led to expect that certain children (in fact, randomly selected for the experimental group) would show unusual intellectual gains; the teachers apparently interacted with these children in ways that actually facilitated their intellectual development. It can be argued that the control-group children were not only deprived of benefits extended to the experimental group, but were denied opportunities they might have had in the absence of the experiment.

As in laboratory experiments, public exposure due to violations of confidentiality is not an issue here, since participants are not even identified. Public exposure becomes an issue only in the sense that some of the participants' shortcomings may be revealed in a public situation; but this is more a matter of embarrassment and shame (relevant to the quality of relationships) than a threat to concrete interests. The major threat to concrete interests comes from impairment of participants' capacity for decision making, which is inherent in this line of research. A central feature of the variety of field experiments that I have included in this category is that participants are not even aware that an experiment is in progress, so that informed consent in the usual sense of the term is virtually impossible. The intrusion and deception represented by this procedure are not particularly problematic when the experimental manipulation "falls within the range of the respondent's ordinary experience, merely being an experimental rearrangement of normal-level communications."[48] The curtailment of informed consent becomes problematic, and a suitable subject for government regulation, when the manipulation involves the staging of a dramatic event that borders on the creation of a public nuisance.

Such potentially disturbing field experiments also raise the issue of stress and indignity, at the level of interpersonal relationships. At the least, they may constitute an imposition on unsuspecting passers-by and cause them inconvenience. Beyond that, they may generate anxiety, internal conflict, guilt, embarrassment, feelings of inadequacy, and unpleasant interactions. The deception and manipulation involved deprive participants of their right to respectful treatment. Perhaps the most important issue is that such procedures, without giving people the opportunity to give or withhold their consent, intrude on their privacy, in the sense of reducing their control over their self-presentations. By misrepresenting themselves and the situation and by catching people unawares, experimenters restrict participants' ability to pick and choose the aspects of themselves they wish to reveal. While people may be confronted with similar experiences in the usual course of events, professional standards must specify the extent to which investigators are entitled to stage them deliberately for experimental purposes.

At the level of wider social values, the major concern generated by field experiments—and hence the major issue for social policy consideration—is again the erosion of trust. Whereas the prevalence of deceptive laboratory experiments would contribute primarily to distrust and cynicism regarding

authorities and social institutions, the prevalence of intrusive field experiments would also affect the level of trust in ordinary relationships. Since field experiments, unlike laboratory experiments, are injected without warning into everyday life, their prevalence may reinforce people's sense of the arbitrariness and irrationality of daily existence and compound the ambiguity of real-life situations that call for bystander intervention.

Organizational and Social Experiments

Research in this category is generally designed to evaluate organizational processes or social policies, which have a bearing on the material well-being of the research participants themselves and of others similarly situated in the organization or the society. Therefore, the major ethical issue that arises at the level of participant interests—and hence the primary focus for government control—is the risk of material injury to the participants and their groups. In large-scale experiments, control-group members may not only be denied the benefits extended to the experimental group, but may actually be worse off as a consequence of the experiment. For example, an experiment that provides housing allowances to some members of a community may contribute to competition and to inflated costs in the housing market for the entire community, thus leaving members of the control group (or, in a community saturation experiment, those who do not meet the criteria for participation)[49] worse off than they were before. Even members of the experimental group, who do receive the intended benefits, may find themselves worse off. Peter G. Brown has demonstrated how participants in a health insurance experiment may actually experience a decline in the quality of their health care.[50]

Moreover, participants risk material (and to some extent psychological) injury at termination of the experiment. For example, individuals who decide to change their employment patterns as a result of their participation in an income maintenance experiment may find, at termination of the experiment, that they can no longer return to the jobs they had given up (or no longer find them as satisfying as in the past).[51] In organizational experiments, some of the participants may be subjected to experimental treatments—such as new ways of organizing the work process or new incentive systems—that they find disadvantageous. Not only the procedures, but also the findings of such studies may cause material injury to participants (and to other present or future members of the organization). For example, as mentioned earlier, the findings may suggest changes in policy with negative consequences for their incomes, fringe benefits, working conditions, or living conditions.

The material interests of participants in social and organizational experiments are further jeopardized by the possibility of public exposure of some of the data they provide. In the New Jersey—Pennsylvania Income Maintenance Experiment,[52] for example, the investigators experienced considerable difficulty in maintaining the confidentiality of the data in the face of pressures

from official agencies.[53] In organizational experiments, even if the confidentiality of individual data is preserved, I have already noted the complexities in disguising the identities of subunits and protecting their members against damaging consequences. Participants' capacity to protect their interests may also be impaired by informed consent procedures. There have been no reports of deliberate deception, but it is often difficult in a complex social experiment to give participants enough information to understand the implications of the rules to which they are committing themselves or to predict the long-run consequences of their participation.[54] Moreover, in experiments sponsored by the government or by their employers, people often are not free—or at least do not feel free—to refuse participation. Obtaining informed consent from control groups and from nonparticipants affected by the experiment may prove particularly troublesome.[55]

Consent, in a broader sense, is the major ethical issue at the level of interpersonal relationships. As Donald P. Warwick points out: "Few social experimenters would disagree with the broad ethical principle that those to be affected by the policies tested by social experiments should take part in their design. Yet none of the experiments conducted to date has been based on anything resembling real participation by target groups."[56] The same holds true for most organizational experiments. In research that has such a direct bearing on the fate of the participants and their groups (usually the disadvantaged segments of the society or the rank and file of an organization), it is important that their "consent" be sought, not only to their personal participation, but also to the definition of the problem and the selection of the options to be subjected to experimental test. At the very least this requires consultation with representatives of the target groups in the design of the experiment (as well as in the subsequent interpretation of the findings). To assume that participants lack the capacity or the authority to contribute to this process is to deprive them of the respect that we owe to autonomous, responsible adults. The issue raised here has ramifications for other types of research as well, underscoring the need for encouraging, within the profession, the development of "participatory research" models.[57]

At the level of wider social values, the major ethical issue raised by social and organizational experimentation is that of inequity. The issue arises particularly in large-scale experiments, in which the government, in effect, provides certain benefits to some citizens (the experimental group) and withholds them from others (the control group), or subjects different groups to more and less desirable treatments. Insofar as participation in the experiment is mandatory—as it is, for example, in experiments within the criminal justice system—such differential treatment raises not only ethical issues, but also the constitutional issue of equal protection of the laws.[58] Potential inequities may arise, not only in the assignment of individuals to different conditions, but also in the selection of the target populations for the experiment. Participation in social experiments may be risky and burdensome, even when it offers certain

short-term benefits to some of the participants. Since the disadvantaged and the poor are more likely to be targeted for research, social experiments may "impose greater burdens on the poor, for the sake of gaining information about human behavior in various markets (such as labor, housing, or health care) that may be useful in formulating policy that will be beneficial to poor and nonpoor alike."[59] Inequities may also arise from the fact that different segments of the population differ in their degree of influence on the definition of the research problem and the design of the experiment; those groups whose points of view dominate the formulation of the alternatives selected for study may also be more likely to benefit from the resultant findings. Debates on social policy need to address the impact of social experiments on the value of equity and need to develop ways of reducing and counteracting their possible contributions to the level of inequity in the society.

Questionnaires and Tests

At the level of participant interests, it is difficult to conceive of injuries that might result from the process of completing a questionnaire or test, other than the loss of time. Perhaps some respondents might be shocked by a highly personal question, or disturbed by an association to a projective test item, or distraught by their poor performance on an intelligence test, but the likelihood that such reactions would cause enduring psychological harm is so remote that it does not call for protective regulation. There is a real possibility that the *findings* of research using test or questionnaire data for group comparisons may be deleterious to the interests of certain groups, particularly minority and disadvantaged populations, but this issue is more appropriately considered under the rubric of wider social values. For individual participants, the threat of injury arises if some of their responses are publicly exposed—through inadvertence or under legal compulsion—subjecting them to the possibility of punishment, harassment, social disapproval, or denial of certain benefits and opportunities. Even if individual responses are not identified, the disclosure of subgroup data (e.g., data for a given work unit or for welfare recipients in a particular neighborhood) may expose the members of that subgroup to damaging consequences.

For these reasons, the primary purpose of government regulation of studies relying on questionnaires or tests is to ensure that investigators maintain the confidentiality of the data and adequately inform participants of any constraints on their ability to maintain confidentiality. Failure to inform participants of such constraints, of course, reduces their capacity to protect their own interests when deciding on participation. Participants' capacity for decision making is also impaired if they are given the explicit or implicit message that they are required to complete the research instruments—an issue that is particularly likely to arise if the research is sponsored by an official agency or conducted in institutional settings with captive populations. The

issue of consent is further complicated when there is controversy about participants' competence to give informed consent. For example, some critics have argued that the distribution of questionnaires in schools—particularly if they deal with such controversial topics as sex, religion, or parent-child relations—requires the consent of the parents, even if the students themselves are clearly informed that they are free to refuse participation.

At the level of interpersonal relationships, there is some possibility that questionnaire or test respondents may experience a degree of stress or discomfort, even though there is no deliberate attempt to induce such reactions. For example, they may feel confused by the instructions, disturbed by some of the questions, annoyed by the choices offered, inadequate because of their inability to answer, or simply bored and imposed upon. Since respondents often do not know precisely what dimensions the instruments are designed to tap, their control over their self-presentation is reduced and they may unwittingly reveal information about themselves that they would prefer to withhold. This is particularly likely to happen when attitude scales or personality tests deliberately disguise the dimensions of concern—through the use of indirect questions or projective tasks—in order to circumvent respondents' tendency to give responses they consider socially approved and mentally healthy. While such procedures withhold information that respondents could use in controlling their self-presentations, I would not regard them as unduly deceptive and invasive, as long as respondents are not given false information and freely enter into the research contract on the basis of the minimal or vague information that they have received about the precise dimensions under scrutiny. More serious ethical problems, amounting to deprivation of respect, would arise if the purpose of the research were deliberately misrepresented or if respondents were subjected to direct or subtle pressures to participate. I list this as the major issue in the second column of table 2.2, not because it is inherent in the use of questionnaires and tests or represents a prevalent practice, but because these instruments are often used in settings in which people are habitually asked to do things without explanation and find it difficult to say no. There may be a temptation, therefore, to take shortcuts in informed consent, which has to be curbed by professional sensitivity to the issue.

At the level of wider social values, the major issue that has confronted this type of research is its potential for reinforcing inequities within the society. This issue, as I have already indicated more than once, has emerged from the interpretation that is often placed on group differences found in studies using questionnaires or psychological tests—such as racial and social-class differences in intelligence, national differences in attitudes toward work, or differences between "deviants" and "normals" on various personality characteristics. There has been a tendency to attribute such differences to enduring characteristics of the groups (i.e., to "blame the victim"), which encourages social policies likely to perpetuate the systemic inequities that may largely

account for the differences. There is nothing inherent in questionnaires or tests—even when they are used to compare demographic groups—that produces such interpretations and policies. However, they readily lend themselves to dispositional attributions because they focus on characteristics of individuals and because they produce quantitative data on objective instruments that are presumed to have the same meaning for the different groups compared. Since the products of this particular line of research play a significant role in the policy process, the research itself becomes a relevant focus for policy debate. A more general impact on wider social values of the proliferation of questionnaires and tests, probing into a variety of personal matters, is that it reduces the amount of private space available in the society. The policy implications of this issue need to be explored in the context of debates about the entire range of social processes and institutions (including, for example, the mass media) that contribute to the reduction of private space in modern society.

Surveys and Interview Studies

Many of the issues raised by survey research and the use of personal interviews are identical to those raised by questionnaires and tests, but some special considerations are introduced by the collection of data through face-to-face interactions, and by some of the social uses to which surveys are put. At the level of participant interests, the risk of injury resulting from the interview process is as low as it is in questionnaire studies, and the possibility that the findings of the research may be injurious to group interests is as real as it is in questionnaire studies. Again, the major concern is public exposure of an individual's responses, and the primary focus for government regulation is therefore to ensure confidentiality of the data and communication to participants of any constraints on the investigator's ability to maintain confidentiality. The capacity of respondents to protect their own interests when deciding on participation is impaired if the interviewer misrepresents the organization that is conducting the survey or the overall purpose of the survey. Such misrepresentations, however, are completely contrary to the norms of survey methodology and are frowned upon by reputable survey organizations. Respondents may be subject to some pressures deriving from the dynamics of a face-to-face request; to turn down such requests is considered discourteous and places the individual in a bad light. Yet, there is evidence that many people do feel free to refuse an interview. This feeling is reinforced by one of the important features of survey research: Interviews are typically carried out in the setting of the respondent's home—or, increasingly now, over the telephone.

At the level of interpersonal relationships, the interview situation may create some stress and discomfort, although a skilled interviewer can keep these to a minimum. Still, respondents may feel inadequate because they lack

information on the topic on which they are being questioned or because they have no opinions on matters on which they feel they are expected to have opinions; they may feel embarrassed and uncomfortable about the opinions they do have, expecting the interviewer to disapprove of them; they may feel constrained by the form of the interview and frustrated because they are not given the opportunity to discuss the topic on their own terms; or they may feel anxious because of uncertainties about the organization that is asking all these questions and its purposes. Respondents' control over their self-presentation is reduced by the fact that the interviewer may not always give them complete information about the study and may ask questions that are indirect or not obviously related to the topic of the interview. Such procedures, however, are generally within the terms of the contract formed when the respondent agrees to be interviewed, assuming there was no misrepresentation. Respondents' control over their self-presentation is further reduced by the interpersonal aspects of the interview situation. Respondents may prefer not to answer certain questions because they are embarrassed about their opinions or their lack of opinions, but they may feel under pressure to respond. Failure to do so would itself be embarrassing because it would both violate the implicit contract they agreed to and reveal something about their areas of sensitivity or ignorance. Such subtle pressures, which are normal features of social interaction, do not represent serious ethical problems as long as the interviewer does not use coercive or manipulative tactics. Nevertheless, I list reduced control over self-presentation as the major issue here, to which professional standards need to be addressed, because it bears directly on the sensitivity with which the interrogation itself—the central tool of the survey method—is carried out. Blatant deprivations of respect for the respondent, in the form of deception and coercion, are rare in survey research, in part because the typical setting in which interviews are carried out is the respondents' home territory.

At the level of wider social values, the proliferation of surveys—along with questionnaire studies—contributes to the reduction of private space. What I see as the major issue at this level, however, to which public debate needs to address itself, relates to some of the special uses to which survey methods are being put in our society. It must be stressed that these uses are not inherent in survey methodology and characterize only a small proportion of the research based on sample surveys or other interview procedures. I have in mind surveys whose primary purpose (or at least practical purpose) is to find out how best to sell to the public a product, a political candidate, a program, or a policy. I do not refer to the use of surveys in the development of a program or policy (or even a commercial product), where there is a genuine interest in exploring public needs and concerns to ensure that these are being seriously considered and adequately met. Rather, I refer to surveys designed to help in the packaging of the product (commercial or political) and in projecting the desired image. Such surveys often try to discover people's vulnerabilities, prejudices, and secret dreams, so that these can be exploited in selling the product. Ethical

concerns are likely to differ, as a function of the nature of the product that is being sold and the interests that are being served. For example, we may not be too concerned about public-health research seeking the best ways to "sell" the public on the importance of regular blood pressure tests or the dangers of smoking. But, at least in the political arena and in market research, there is concern that survey methods may be used to manipulate the public in the interest of political power and corporate profit. In the political sphere, as I mentioned above, such uses of surveys and electoral polls may contribute to the perversion of the political process, shifting the focus from debating the issues to selling the candidate. Not only may surveys provide information on how best to accomplish that, but the results of polls taken in the course of a political campaign may themselves shape the preferences of voters and the activities of candidates. I do not wish to suggest that the use of surveys in politics and marketing is always destructive of wider social values, but it does raise the issue of possible perversion of the political and economic process and, more generally, of contributing to the level of manipulation in the society.

Records and Secondary Analysis

At the level of participant interests, the major issue that arises in the analysis of records and documents, or in the secondary analysis of data from earlier surveys or questionnaire studies, is the risk of public exposure. The primary purpose of government regulation, therefore, is to ensure that the confidentiality of the data is maintained, preferably by removing all identifying information. Another issue that needs to be considered is whether respondents' consent is required to the new use of the data they originally supplied. Assuming they did not know that their data would be used in subsequent studies, their capacity to protect their interests was clearly impaired when they originally consented to providing the information. The question is whether their tacit consent to the subsequent analyses can be taken for granted. It can be argued that individuals are generally aware (or should be aware) of the possibility that personal information they provide to hospitals, schools, or agencies may be used for subsequent statistical analyses, since such analyses are routinely performed and often reported in the press. An even stronger case for tacit consent can be made with respect to secondary analysis, on the presumption that people agreeing to participate in a study have no particular expectations about who will perform what analyses to test which hypotheses. Serious ethical problems arise only when respondents agree to provide information for one specific purpose and the data are then used for a clearly different purpose.

The failure to obtain consent for a clearly different use of the data than the one originally agreed upon would also represent an ethical problem at the level of interpersonal relationships. Investigators working with data collected by others do not have a direct relationship with the respondents, but in accepting

their data they incur an obligation to honor the original contract. Failure to do so deprives the respondents of the respect to which they are entitled.[60]

At the level of wider social values, the major issue raised by research based on records and secondary analysis is the reduction of private space. The practice of opening people's records to research and widening the circle of those to whom personal information about them is made available may weaken the boundaries that the society sustains between private and public domains. It may help to create the feeling that personal data revealed in a restricted context will sooner or later become public property. On the other hand, it can be argued that the sharing and recycling of data help to preserve privacy by reducing the number of intrusions by researchers into people's lives. Although this type of research probably does not represent a serious invasion of privacy (as long as the confidentiality of the personal data is scrupulously protected), it ought to be considered in the context of policy debates on the entire range of threats to privacy within the society.

Structured Observation

At the level of participant interests, the risk that people taking part in a structured-observation study might be injured in any way is quite low. It is conceivable that in certain of the interaction situations that are especially arranged for the purpose of systematic observation, psychologically vulnerable people might experience a high level of anxiety. This could happen, for example, if participants in a self-analytic group are induced to go too far in self-revelation or find themselves scapegoated by fellow participants; or if participants in a stress interview are subjected to relentless pressure or hostile attack. Although it is unlikely that such experiences will result in enduring psychological injuries, it is important for investigators to monitor participant reactions carefully when the interaction situations they observe have the potential for producing anxiety. The risk of public exposure is not much of an issue in this type of research, since the observations typically focus on behavior in the situation, producing data about the participants that are of little interest to outside parties.

Impaired capacity for decision making, on the other hand, may well arise as an issue, particularly when the observations focus on interactions in structured real-life settings such as classrooms, therapy or encounter groups, and conferences. In such situations, the investigator—though making no secret of the fact that observations (or recordings) are being made—may be casual about obtaining participants' consent or may subtly discourage participants from raising objections. The problem becomes more serious if the investigator (in laboratory or nonlaboratory studies) deliberately keeps the participants uninformed of the presence of observers; or if the observers or listeners are hidden, perhaps using mechanical devices (such as one-way mirrors or hidden recorders) to extend their vision or hearing without the participants' know-

ledge; or if other deceptions are introduced, such as the use of a preinstructed "stooge." Although such deliberate deceptions appear to be quite rare in structured-observation studies, they represent the main potential threat to the interests of the participants and hence the primary focus for government regulation.

At the level of interpersonal relationships, I have already raised the possibility that some of the interaction situations arranged for laboratory observation may be stressful. In nonlaboratory situations, particularly situations in which people express intense personal feelings and reveal their conflicts and vulnerabilities—as in therapy or encounter groups—participants may experience the mere presence of uninvolved observers as stressful and degrading and may consider it an invasion of their privacy. Their control over their self-presentation is reduced by the sometimes contradictory requirements of impressing the observers and impressing fellow participants. Hidden observation and other deceptions, of course, reduce their control over self-presentation in different ways and also raise the issue of deprivation of respect.

At the level of wider social values, the major issue arising in this type of research is that the proliferation of observation studies in a variety of real-life settings may contribute to the reduction of private space within the society.

Unobtrusive Observation

The issues raised by unobtrusive observation depend very much on the particular context in which the observations are made. Serious ethical problems arise when people are secretly observed in a situation that they had a right to consider private, particularly if hidden mechanical devices are employed.[61] Another set of problems arises in the typical field experiment, in which the investigator makes unobtrusive observations after introducing certain experimental manipulations into the natural setting. For the present purposes, however, I refer only to unobtrusive observation focusing on ongoing behavior in a *public* situation, not manipulated for experimental purposes. In this context, unobtrusive observation does not present any risks of injury to the unwitting participant. There is also no risk of public exposure of individuals, since the participants are not identified, although there is the possibility of public exposure that might prove embarrassing to the group being observed. The only serious issue, at the level of participant interests, is the impairment of participants' capacity for decision making. By definition, there is no informed consent in this type of research, since participants are not aware that they are systematically being observed. On the other hand, as long as the investigators do not hide, or misrepresent themselves, or intervene in the situation, their observations consist essentially of public behavior, accessible to anyone who happens to be present. It can be assumed, in such a situation, that people know their behavior is potentially observable by others (even if they do not know that these others include social scientists) and that they already do what is necessary to protect their interests in view of this possibility.

At the level of interpersonal relationships, the fact that participants are not aware that they are systematically being observed raises the issue of invasion of privacy, in the sense of reduced control over self-presentation. If they knew they were being observed, they might wish to act differently. It can be argued, however, that whenever people act in a public situation, they are in effect waiving their right to privacy, since they must (and do) accept the possibility that they will be observed by others. The right to privacy is never completely relinquished: Social norms (such as those against eavesdropping and staring) set limits to the kinds of observations that are permissible even in public situations. However, when social scientists make systematic observations of public behavior that would be accessible, within the limits set by social norms, to anyone else who took the trouble to look, they are not being unduly invasive of people's privacy.

At the level of wider social values, the major issue again is that the proliferation of studies in this genre may contribute to the reduction of private space. Even though we are dealing with public behavior, there is a difference between knowing that random passers-by may be able to observe what we are doing and feeling that, at any time, a professional social scientist may be out there, systematically focusing on particular categories of our behavior, counting their frequency and rating their intensity. Such observations of naturally occurring behavior by social scientists are not unlike those made by journalists, novelists, travel writers, and moralists. They are equally legitimate, but also at least equally likely to impinge on the sense of privacy in a society.

Participant Observation

At the level of participant interests, the risk of injury of any kind resulting from the interaction between participant observers and the people they observe (as distinct from injury resulting from publication of the data) is minimal, and indeed there is no evidence that such studies have caused long-term damage.[62] The major risks of injury stem from the possibility of public exposure. The participant observer is often privy to personal information about individuals and to sensitive information about groups, organizations, and communities, disclosure of which might cause them embarrassment and damage their material interests in a variety of ways—e.g., by subjecting them to legal action or to withdrawal of financial support. Thus, the primary concern for government regulation of this type of research is to ensure that investigators maintain confidentiality or provide clear information about any external limits on their ability to protect the confidentiality of the data and about their own plans for publication.

The problem of public exposure in field studies is illustrated by the controversial Springdale study,[63] in which community members and other critics felt that the investigators broke their promise of anonymity. Although

the publication used pseudonyms, the town and many of its inhabitants were readily identified, which caused them considerable embarrassment and hurt. Publication of reports of anthropological field studies, of community studies (particularly if they involve minority communities), and of studies of deviant groups and their organizations may damage the group interests of the populations observed, by creating or reinforcing stereotypes and adversely affecting public opinion and public policy.[64] Of course, such reports may also benefit the groups involved, by correcting commonly held stereotypes, by providing a sounder understanding of their realities and their problems, and by thus creating a more favorable climate for public opinion and public policy.

The risks of public exposure are intensified when the observation is disguised, the investigator having gained access to the people observed through misrepresentation. The research in this genre that has aroused the greatest amount of debate and controversy is the study by Humphreys, who was able to observe male homosexual activities in public restrooms by posing as a "watchqueen," or lookout.[65] He also recorded the automobile license numbers of a sample of the men he observed, traced the men through police license registers by posing as a market researcher, and interviewed them in their homes a year later by adding them to the sample of a health survey. Other examples of disguised observation come from the various studies in which investigators join an organization under false pretenses in order to gain access to activities from which nonmembers would normally be excluded.[66] These misrepresentations clearly impair people's capacity to decide what to reveal or not to reveal to an outsider and hence to protect themselves against the possible consequences of wider exposure. The ethical problems here parallel those raised by deception in experiments, but they are even more serious because the risk of injury (in the event of public exposure) is generally greater.[67] In many of these studies, for example, the disguised observer gains access to information that the group members deliberately want to keep secret—because their behavior is illegal, socially disapproved of, or part of an organizational strategy. Disguised observation can be justified more readily if the behavior observed is in principle subject to public scrutiny. For example, in defense of Rosenhan's[68] and other pseudopatient studies, it can be argued that the hospital staff's treatment of their patients is not protected by the right to privacy: Staff members have in effect waived that right in adopting their professional and institutional roles. Alternatively, insofar as such studies are undertaken to increase the accountability of public institutions, it can be argued that the staff's right to privacy is outweighed by the clients' rights to protection against abuse or neglect. Still, the observers' covert entry into the situation remains ethically troublesome.

Disguised observation also raises the issue, at the level of interpersonal relationships, of reduced control over self-presentation. Even when they are not particularly concerned about potential damages to their concrete interests, people tend to relate differently to fellow members of their own groups than

they do to outsiders. By pretending to be group members, the observers induce them to say or do things in their presence that they may wish to reserve for fellow members. Control over self-presentation is also reduced if the observers are themselves genuine group members, but do not acknowledge the fact that they are making systematic observations. The ethical problem in this case is much less severe, as long as the observations focus only on activities in which the observers participate as part of their normal membership roles. Group members must always reckon with the possibility that someone in their midst might write about their experiences—in a novel or a memoir, if not in a social science monograph. The way in which member-observers subsequently use their observations has more critical implications for privacy than the fact that they make unacknowledged observations. Even when participant observers acknowledge their research interest and are accepted on that basis, some reduction in group members' control over their self-presentation may ensue because of the ambiguities inherent in the participant observer role. Group members may come to accept the observers as part of the scenery and act unself-consciously in their presence, revealing information they might prefer to keep private. However, such an eventuality raises ethical problems only if observers deliberately take advantage of the ambiguity of the role—e.g., by implying a greater level of commitment to the group than they actually feel—and thereby seduce group members to confide in them more than they otherwise would.[69]

Disguised observation clearly constitutes a deprivation of respect, which I see as the major ethical issue raised by participant observation research at the level of interpersonal relationships. In some ways, deception in participant observation is more profoundly disrespectful of others than it is in laboratory experiments, since it is not confined to a special experimental situation, which can be isolated from the rest of life, but enters into real-life and sometimes continuing relationships. It should be noted, however, that disguised observation is only one of several models of participant observation (or fieldwork), and the one that raises uniquely knotty ethical problems.[70] The other models, of course, are not entirely free of their own ethical complexities. In one of the models distinguished by Joan Cassell, the *verandah* model, disrespect for the people studied manifests itself in the coercive, exploitative, patronizing, and nonreciprocal relationship that the investigator tends to establish with them.[71] On the whole, however, participant observation research—particularly as it has evolved in anthropological fieldwork—has been more respectful of the people from whom it obtains its data than many other research traditions. It has been characterized by a greater degree of reciprocity between investigator and participant, equality of power, and two-way interaction, thus approximating a model of participatory research.[72]

At the level of wider social values, participant observation research may contribute to prevailing inequities within the national and the global society, insofar as it reinforces stereotypes about minority and deviant communities or

Third World societies and encourages policies focusing on group "deficiencies" rather than on inequalities rooted in social structure. The proliferation of participant observers in a variety of groups and organizations may contribute to the reduction of private space in the society. However, the most important threat of diffuse harm to social values comes, again, from disguised observation. The knowledge that hidden observers may insinuate themselves into various private relationships and group activities, often on a continuing basis, is bound to contribute to the erosion of trust. Although their purpose is social research, the cumulative effect of such practices must be examined in the context of the widespread use of spies and undercover agents (and perhaps the even more widespread suspicion of their use) for many other legitimate and illegitimate purposes.

Implications

The analysis presented in this chapter has relied heavily upon a harm-benefit framework. I consider the harm-benefit approach, if broadly conceived, as a useful and probably necessary tool for making ethical decisions in social research. Our primary concern is with protecting and enhancing the well-being of research participants and of others who are, or may in the future be, affected by the research. We therefore have an obligation to minimize the risk of harm caused by the research and to forgo research that carries unacceptable risks. Not even minimal risks can be justified unless the probable benefits outweigh them. (The converse does not hold true: Certain risks cannot be justified no matter how large the probable benefits.)[73] Harm-benefit considerations are also central to our notions about the rights of research participants. Such rights as the right to informed consent or the right to privacy are not mere abstractions, but conditions for maintaining people's well-being. That is, these rights are ultimately linked to our concern with meeting our basic needs and interests and protecting ourselves against harm.

Even though I regard harm and benefit considerations as basic to the analysis of ethical issues in research with human participants, the particular model of risk-benefit calculation as it has evolved in biomedical research is of only limited usefulness in social research. In biomedical research itself, the model applies most clearly to the decision whether a given experimental treatment procedure should be used on a particular patient. One can reasonably base such a decision on the ratio between the risks entailed by the procedure and its probable benefits, relative to the risk-benefit ratio for the standard treatment procedures that are available. These estimates may be difficult to make, but the logic of the approach is straightforward. As one moves from this situation to biomedical research in which the experimental procedure is not related to the subject's own treatment, the calculations become considerably more complicated, since they involve balancing risks to the subject against potential benefits to future patients and/or to science. Still,

at least with respect to the risks, one is dealing with measurable physical injuries that can be entered into the calculation. Even within the biomedical sciences, however, there seem to be other lines of research in which risk-benefit calculations are not particularly relevant to the ethical issues raised.[14] Whether or not this is so, I would argue that, at least as far as social research is concerned, risk-benefit analyses are often not particularly relevant to the ethical decision about whether or not to proceed with a given piece of research. There are several reasons for this conclusion, which I hope have emerged from previous sections of this chapter.

1. By and large, the probability that participants in most social research will incur concrete injuries in the course of the research process is low, as is the magnitude of the injuries that might occur. I have pointed to the possibility that certain laboratory experiments and observations, as well as certain field experiments, might cause psychological injury, although there is no evidence that enduring damage has actually resulted from participation in such studies. Only in one type of research—social and organizational experiments—are participants, in principle, exposed to serious risks of injury, in the form of material losses, since the experimental manipulations may affect such significant life resources and opportunities as income, housing, health care, working conditions, educational programs, or conditions of parole. At the same time, the magnitude of potential concrete benefits accruing to participants is generally low—again, with the possible exception of participants in large-scale social experiments. The benefits to be derived from social research largely take the form of contributions to science and society; these contributions are not readily predictable or demonstrable—and, in any case, they do not directly advance the well-being of the participants themselves. Under these circumstances, the calculation of risk-benefit ratios in social science studies—with some notable exceptions—may largely be a hypothetical exercise that hampers research without really addressing the critical ethical issues.

2. The major threats to the concrete interests of participants in social research do not come from the research procedures themselves, but from the possibility of public exposure of information about identifiable individuals or groups. Public exposure may seriously affect people's reputations and may subject them to the possibility of harassment and punishment—even to the point of imprisonment or death, if, for example, the research is done in an area of intense domestic or international conflict. The real concern in this context, to which regulation must address itself, is to ensure that investigators maintain the confidentiality of the data or clearly inform participants of any limits to their ability to do so. The urgency of maintaining confidentiality varies, of course, as a function of the magnitude of the danger to which participants would be exposed if their responses were publicly identified. But, except in extreme cases, it is very difficult to predict what might happen as a consequence of exposure. The principles of confidentiality and privacy are

designed to protect participants against the possibility of harm caused by unforeseeable as well as foreseeable future circumstances. If they were made conditional on calculation of the magnitude of harm anticipated, they would lose much of their protective value. Thus, although the right to confidentiality and privacy is ultimately rooted in concerns about the possible harms to participants, it must be treated as functionally autonomous. That is, the right has moral force regardless of whether, in any given case, it can be demonstrated that its violation would cause harm. It is presumed that any violation of this right is damaging—if not in the short run, then in the long run; if not to the particular individual involved, then to the larger society (by weakening an important protective mechanism). In the ethical evaluation of procedures used to protect participants against unacceptable public exposure, therefore, the primary issue is the risk of violations of confidentiality (and the concomitant requirement that participants be fully informed of such risks) rather than the risk of harm if confidentiality were violated.

3. The requirement of informed consent, like that of confidentiality, is ultimately rooted in concerns about possible harms to participants' concrete interests. The requirement is designed to ensure that participants have the opportunity and the capacity to decide for themselves what is in their best interest and what risks they are prepared to take. The urgency of ensuring informed consent varies, of course, as a function of the magnitude of the potential harm entailed by a given piece of research. But, in the final analysis, the decision of how large an injury is too large and how much of a risk is too much must be left to the individual. If the availability of the informed consent procedures were made conditional on calculation of the magnitude of harm by others (IRBs, for example), it would lose much of its value as a protective device for participants themselves. The right to informed consent, therefore, must also be treated as functionally autonomous. Thus, in the ethical evaluation of informed consent procedures, impairment of participants' capacity for decision making is an issue that must be considered independently of the magnitude of demonstrable harm to which participation might expose them.

Appropriate procedures for informed consent are relatively straightforward when it is possible to spell out in advance the risks entailed by participation. In social research, it is often impossible to predict the consequences of the research (particularly the consequences of publication of the findings) or even to describe in advance what will happen in the course of the research. Furthermore, there are some types of social research that would not be feasible if standard procedures for obtaining informed consent were to be used. Examples are those studies in which participants are not even informed that they are being observed, or in which some information about the research is withheld or deceptions are introduced in the interest of obtaining valid data. The mere fact that such studies may entail only negligible risks of injury is not in itself sufficient reason to sidestep informed consent. On the other hand,

there may be justifications for modifying or even omitting informed consent procedures in certain instances, particularly as one moves away from research that involves manipulations of the person or the environment. In any event, risk-benefit analysis is of only limited utility in devising procedures that would uphold participants' capacity to protect their own interests in social research.

4. In much of social research (and in a fair amount of biomedical research, as well), the findings may have harmful consequences for the groups that are studied. Since potential damage to group interests affects the individual participant only indirectly, it cannot readily be incorporated in the standard risk-benefit calculation, which focuses on the individual. Similarly, procedures for obtaining informed consent from individual participants will not in most cases provide proper protection against possible harms to group interests; concerns in this domain have to be addressed through other means, such as consultation with group representatives. On the whole, group interests are probably not as well protected as individual interests by the regulatory process, as embodied in IRBs, because their definition is often a matter of controversy both within and between different groups in the society. The protection of group interests, therefore, requires particular attention at the professional and public policy levels.

5. The harm that participants may experience in the course of their involvement in social research may often take the form of stress and indignity. These are temporary situational effects, which debase the quality of the relationship between investigator and participant, but do not cause long-term measurable damage to the participant's interests. Exposing people to stress and indignity is certainly a harm, since respectful treatment by others is a condition for personal well-being. Furthermore, the difference between temporary effects and enduring injuries is often merely a quantitative one. For example, a single instance in which a person is made to feel inadequate or degraded may be a source of temporary discomfort; but the cumulative effect of repeated experiences of this kind may well be a chronic lowering of the person's self-esteem, constituting psychological injury.[15] Nevertheless, it is difficult to enter temporary discomforts into risk-benefit calculations in the absence of measurable injuries that can directly be attributed to these experiences. By the same token, these are not the types of harm for which government regulation, with its coercive backing, is an appropriate form of social control. Instead, I have argued, they should be controlled through the development and refinement of professional standards. At that level, we are less bound to the negative emphasis of the risk-benefit model, which links regulation to evidence that certain procedures are potentially harmful; we can instead focus on the positive task of defining the contours of a good investigator-participant relationship as a matter of continuing professional attention.[16]

6. Another type of harm that may be caused by social research—and by many lines of biomedical research, as well—takes the form of diffuse harms to

the body politic. Such harms may result not only from the procedures of the research, but also from its findings. They can generally not be traced to a particular study, but represent the cumulative impact of a continuing line of research. They do not involve direct effects on the individual participants in the research, but effects on the larger society and on wider social values. They are typically subject to disagreements within the society, both about the occurrence or nonoccurrence of a particular impact and about its harmful or beneficial implications. For all of these reasons, diffuse harms cannot readily be entered into the standard risk-benefit calculations that are undertaken as part of the regulation of individual research projects. The issues raised by the possible impact of social research on wider social values clearly require a balancing of potential harms against potential benefits, but within the context of public policy debate rather than within a regulatory framework.

In pointing out the limitations of the standard risk-benefit requirement, I am not suggesting that government regulation of social research is unnecessary. I have already stressed the appropriateness and clear necessity of such regulation when the protection of the participants' concrete interests is at stake. I am suggesting, however, that the scope, the focus, and the specific form of government regulation have to be adapted in view of the special characteristics of different types of social research and the nature of the ethical issues raised by each. Furthermore, I am suggesting that government regulation is only one form of social control, which cannot substitute for the development and refinement of professional standards and broader social policies designed to enhance the well-being of research participants and the integrity of social values.

My review of ethical issues confronting different research methods indicates that the risk of injury resulting directly from research participation is not a major concern for the vast bulk of social science studies. Only in social and organizational experiments are the material injuries to which participants are potentially subject of sufficient magnitude to become a central consideration in regulation and prior review. Though of lesser magnitude, the risks of psychological injury resulting from laboratory experiments and simulations and from structured observations in laboratory settings, and the risk of psychological or material injury resulting from field experiments, also must be considered; generally the risks involved in these studies are of such a nature that informed consent would be sufficient to provide the needed protection.

The two major issues in social research that have direct implications for participant interests and to which regulation must address itself are public exposure and impaired capacity for decision making. The risks entailed by public exposure and hence the need to regulate the confidentiality of the data are a central concern in research based on questionnaires and tests, in surveys and interview studies, in studies based on records and secondary analysis, and in participant observation studies, as well as in social and organizational experiments. Impairment of participants' capacity for decision making is a

central issue in laboratory experiments employing deception, in intrusive field experiments, in structured observation using hidden observers, and in disguised participant observation. The problem may also arise in social or organizational experiments and in questionnaire and test studies, if people are led to believe (by virtue of the setting or the auspices) that their participation is required; and in studies based on records and secondary analysis, if the data are used for purposes that clearly diverge from those for which consent was originally granted. Studies using unobtrusive observation of public events, by their very nature, do not offer participants the opportunity for informed consent, but I take the view that in such public situations people give tacit consent to observation of their behavior.[17]

The review of ethical issues confronting different research methods also highlights practices that bear on the quality of the investigator-participant relationship, even though they may not cause demonstrable long-term injuries. Participants may be subjected to stressful or degrading experiences in laboratory experiments and simulations, particularly where deception is also involved; in intrusive field experiments; and, less frequently, in structured-observation studies. They may also experience a certain degree of discomfort—arising from the nature of the questions or from their own sense of inadequacy—when responding to questionnaires, tests, or personal interviews. Invasion of privacy, in the sense of reduced control over self-presentation, is potentially a central issue in field experiments; in structured observation studies, particularly when they use hidden observers; in participant observation studies, particularly when the observer is disguised; and in studies based on unobtrusive observation, particularly when they violate social norms against eavesdropping and staring. Respondents' control over their self-presentation is also reduced by the use of indirect or projective items in questionnaires or tests and by the dynamics of the interaction process in many interview situations.

Similarly, there are a variety of ways in which participants' choices may be restricted, depriving them of respect for their personal autonomy. This may happen in laboratory and field experiments, whenever participants are deceived and manipulated; in organizational and social experiments, whenever participants or their representatives are excluded from the process of selecting the options to be investigated; in questionnaire or test studies, whenever investigators take advantage of the setting to induce participation without giving people much choice or explanation; in studies based on records or secondary analysis, whenever investigators violate the contract under which the data were originally collected; and in participant observation studies, whenever investigators misrepresent themselves or treat informants in a patronizing, exploitative way.

This review brings to the fore a number of issues to which the social science professions must address themselves, as we continue to develop and refine professional standards governing the investigator-participant relationship.

What are the limits of stress and deception that an investigator can impose on research participants? What are the limits of permissible intrusion and interference in real-life settings? How do investigators avoid taking advantage of positions of power within the society, within a particular institutional setting, and within the research interaction itself, to manipulate research participants? What special obligation do investigators have to protect the rights and interests of disadvantaged and powerless populations on whom they carry out research? What obligations do investigators have in debriefing research participants, in feeding back to them the findings of the research, in reciprocating the help that they have received? What obligations do they have to people whose data they use when these data were collected by others? To what extent are they responsible for the ways in which others interpret and use their own findings? What alternative approaches can be developed to replace procedures that are deceptive, coercive, or intrusive, or violate in other ways the standards for good interpersonal relationships? How can social science further develop research models and practices that are based on the principles of participation and reciprocity and that enhance the autonomy of the research participant? Concern with these issues at the level of professional practice makes it possible, as I suggested above, to move from an emphasis on avoiding harm through professional misconduct to an emphasis on the positive task of developing a reciprocally enriching relationship between the investigator and the participant.

Finally, the review of different types of research helps us focus on the impact of social science on wider social values. There are various ways in which social research may cause diffuse harm by contributing to the weakening of certain values on which the integrity of social institutions and social relations is based. The level of privacy in the society may be reduced by the proliferation of questionnaires, tests, and interviews, particularly when these probe into areas that most people consider parts of their private space; by the use of personal records for research purposes; and by observation studies in real-life settings, especially when they interfere with ongoing activities or intrude on relationships from which outsiders are generally excluded. The erosion of trust may be furthered in a number of ways: trust in authorities and institutions by the proliferation of deceptive laboratory experiments; trust in ordinary day-to-day relationships by intrusive field experiments; and trust in one's associates in various groups and organizations by research using disguised participant observers. The value of equity may be compromised by social experiments that provide unequal treatment to different groups; by questionnaire and test studies focusing on group differences; and by participant observation studies featuring the characteristics of minority or Third World communities. Some of the uses of survey methodology—particularly in electoral polling and market research—may contribute to the perversion of political and economic processes and, more broadly, to manipulation of the public. In fact, the potential that their methods and findings may be used for

manipulative purposes runs through many areas of social research that contribute directly or indirectly to creating knowledge about the control of human behavior.[78]

Social control with respect to these potentially harmful effects of social research on wider social values must be exercised, I have argued, through the public policy process, in which such effects have to be balanced against the potential social benefits of social research and of particular investigations. In the debate of these issues, the potential diffuse harms of social research have to be seen in the context of other societal processes that contribute to the erosion of trust, the invasion of privacy, the spread of manipulation, and the perpetuation of inequity. As a committed social scientist, I hope—and continue to believe—that social research will contribute more to the solution of these problems than to their aggravation.

Notes

This chapter was completed while I was a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and I gratefully acknowledge the Center's support. I also wish to express my appreciation to Tom Beauchamp, Ruth Faden, and Jay Wallace for their exceptionally careful and creative editing of the chapter and their thoughtful and stimulating questions and suggestions. Their comments and my discussions with them both forced and helped me to clarify my thinking on a number of central issues.

1.   For a review of these issues, see Herbert C. Kelman, "Research, Behavioral," in Warren T. Reich, ed., *Encyclopedia of Bioethics* (New York: Macmillan and Free Press, 1978), vol. 3.

2.   The intention here is not to contrast a utilitarian framework with a deontological one as bases for justifying moral decisions. I refer to risk-benefit analysis and to a rights-based analysis not as different ways of *grounding* moral decisions, but as different *procedures* for arriving at such decisions. Either one of these procedures may be used, in my view, whether one subscribes to a utilitarian or to a deontological theory. Moreover, these two procedures are not mutually exclusive and may well be used in complementary fashion.

3.   The argument in the following section is not essential to an understanding of the rest of the chapter. Readers who are not particularly interested in the nature of moral justification as such may, therefore, prefer to skip this section.

4.   I speak here of "having" dignity in a descriptive, behavioral sense. I also believe that humans have dignity in the ontological sense, but—though this may be the ultimate justification for the moral principles I favor—my present concern is with the conditions for dignity as behaviorally manifested.

5.   Herbert C. Kelman, "The Conditions, Criteria, and Dialectics of Human Dignity: A Transnational Perspective," *International Studies Quarterly* 21 (1977): 531.

6.   Ibid., pp. 531-33.

7.   A person's sense of identity and sense of community are closely related to, but not synonymous with, objective identity and community. They can be viewed as both determinants and consequences of the objective states.

8.   In terms of the three principles described in the preceding chapter, identity corresponds to the principle of autonomy and community corresponds to the principles of beneficence and nonmaleficence, and the just distribution of harms and benefits.

9.   Kelman, "Research, Behavioral," pp. 1472-74, 1476-78.

10. An exhaustive categorization of potential harms resulting from social research can be found in Donald P. Warwick's chapter in the present volume.

11. See Kelman, "Research, Behavioral," as well as Herbert C. Kelman, "The Rights of the Subject in Social Research: An Analysis in Terms of Relative Power and Legitimacy," *American Psychologist* 27 (1972): 989-1016, for an elaboration of the distinction between ethical problems relating to the processes of social research and those relating to the products of social research.

12. Kelman, "Research, Behavioral," p. 1474.

13. Oscar M. Ruebhausen and Orville G. Brim, Jr., "Privacy and Behavioral Research," *Columbia Law Review* 65 (1965): 1189.

14. Herbert C. Kelman, "Privacy and Research with Human Beings," *Journal of Social Issues* 33, no. 3 (1977): 169.

15. Alasdair MacIntyre, "Risk, Harm, and Benefit Assessments as Instruments of Moral Evaluation," in the present volume. See also Donald Warwick's chapter in this volume.

16. Herbert C. Kelman, "Compliance, Identification, and Internalization: Three Processes of Attitude Change," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 2 (1958): 51-60; idem, "Processes of Opinion Change," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 25 (1961): 57-78; idem, "Patterns of Personal Involvement in the National System: A Social-Psychological Analysis of Political Legitimacy," in James N. Rosenau, ed., *International Politics and Foreign Policy*, 2nd ed. (New York: Free Press, 1969), pp. 276-88; and Herbert C. Kelman, "Social Influence and Linkages between the Individual and the Social System," in James Tedeschi, ed., *Perspectives on Social Power* (Chicago: Aldine, 1974), pp. 125-71.

17. Chris Argyris, "Dangers in Applying Results from Experimental Social Psychology," *American Psychologist* 30 (1975): 469-85.

18. See the discussion of harms to society in Donald Warwick's chapter in this volume.

19. The entire tradition of research rooted in the ideology of "blaming the victim" is subject to this criticism. See William Ryan, *Blaming the Victim* (New York: Pantheon, 1971).

20. For a discussion of some of the issues see Charles W. Roll, Jr., and Albert H. Cantril, *Polls: Their Use and Misuse in Politics* (New York: Basic Books, 1972).

21. I use the term *injury* to refer to a subcategory of harms, namely, harms that are of a relatively enduring nature (as distinguished from momentary stress or discomfort), that affect the individual in a direct and personal way (as distinguished from diffuse harm), and that constitute measurable, demonstrable losses to the individual. The enduring, personal, and measurable character of injuries is what qualifies them as damages to the *concrete* interests of research participants, as specified in the first column of table 2.1. The term *concrete* is meant to distinguish such interests from those that are more ephemeral (e.g., a person's interest in making a good impression) or more remote (e.g., a citizen's interest in a sound foreign policy). The cumulative effects of experiences and policies bearing on these less concrete interests may be quite damaging to the individual, but they do not constitute demonstrable losses that can be attributed to a specific action.

22. These examples are mainly designed to illustrate what is meant by physical injury in social research. There is no implication that these kinds of injury—or some of the other harms discussed in this section—are frequent outcomes of social research or even that they have occurred at all.

23. Several specific examples of research with the potential of lasting psychological harm are described in chapter 8, "The Human Use of Human Subjects," of Herbert C. Kelman, *A Time to Speak: On Human Values and Social Research* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1968), pp. 212-15.

24. Hence I distinguish such harms from injuries, which refer to more enduring and demonstrable losses. See note 21.

25. See Irving M. Piliavin, Judith Rodin, and Jane A. Piliavin, "Good Samaritanism: An Underground Phenomenon?" *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 13 (1969): 289-99, for an example of research of this genre.

26. See Kelman, "Privacy and Research with Human Beings," for a fuller treatment of these three types of concerns.

27. David L. Rosenhan, "On Being Sane in Insane Places," *Science* 179 (1973): 250-58.

28. See June L. Tapp, Herbert C. Kelman, Harry C. Triandis, Lawrence S. Wrightsman, and George V. Coelho, "Continuing Concerns in Cross-Cultural Ethics: A Report," *International Journal of Psychology* 9 (1974): 231-49, for a proposal of safeguards, as they might apply to cross-cultural research.

29. Erving Goffman, starting with his first book, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (New York: Doubleday-Anchor, 1959), has given particular emphasis to this feature of social relations.

30. I am here subscribing to the view that the right to privacy—at least in the sense of control over one's self-presentation—is derivative: Actions that limit people's control over their self-presentation violate their right to privacy only when they violate some other right in the process. For an exposition of this view of privacy, see Judith J. Thomson, "The Right to Privacy," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 4 (1975): 295-314.

31. Erving Goffman, "On the Characteristics of Total Institutions," in *Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates* (Chicago: Aldine, 1962).

32. Laud Humphreys, *Tearoom Trade: Impersonal Sex in Public Places*, enl. ed. (Chicago: Aldine, 1975).

33. R. Dennis Middlemist, Eric S. Knowles, and Charles F. Matter, "Personal Space Invasions in the Lavatory: Suggestive Evidence of Arousal," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 33 (1976): 541-46.

34. Donald P. Warwick, "Tearoom Trade: Means and Ends in Social Research," *Hastings Center Studies* 1, no. 1 (1973): 24-38 (reprinted in Humphreys, *Tearoom Trade*); Gerald P. Koocher, "Bathroom Behavior and Human Dignity," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 35 (1977): 120-21.

35. See Kelman, "Rights of the Subject in Social Research," for a discussion of the disproportionate use of disadvantaged populations in social research and its implications for informed consent.

36. Ad Hoc Committee on Ethical Standards in Psychological Research, *Ethical Principles in the Conduct of Research with Human Participants* (Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association, 1973).

37. Ibid., pp. 1-2.

38. This is one of E. L. Pattullo's proposals at the end of his chapter in the present volume.

39. Interestingly, the government's increasing involvement in research ethics and the development of government regulation have helped not only to draw professional attention to these issues, but also to legitimize such attention.

40. E. L. Pattullo, "Who Risks What in Social Research," *IRB: A Review of Human Subjects Research* 2 (March 1980): 1-3, 12. Pattullo's chapter in this volume considerably expands the arguments of this earlier paper.

41. See Peter H. Rossi, Margaret Boeckmann, and Richard A. Berk, "Some Ethical Implications of the New Jersey-Pennsylvania Income Maintenance Experiment," in Gordon Bermant, Herbert C. Kelman, and Donald P. Warwick, eds., *The Ethics of Social Intervention* (Washington, D.C.: Hemisphere Publishing Corp., 1978), pp. 245-66. For a general review of issues in social experimentation, see Alice M. Rivlin and P. Michael Timpane, eds., *Ethical and Legal Issues of Social Experimentation* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1975).

42. Philip G. Zimbardo, Craig Haney, W. Curtis Banks, and David Jaffe, "The Psychology of Imprisonment: Privation, Power, and Pathology," in Zick Rubin, ed., *Doing unto Others* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974), pp. 61-73. It is worth noting, incidentally, that this study did not involve deliberate deception.

43. Dana Bramel, "A Dissonance Theory Approach to Defensive Projection," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* 64 (1962): 121-29; idem, "Selection of a Target for Defensive Projection," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* 66 (1963): 318-24; Allen E. Bergin, "The Effect of Dissonant Persuasive Communications upon Changes in a Self-Referring Attitude," *Journal of Personality* 30 (1962): 423-38.

44. Stanley Milgram, *Obedience to Authority* (New York: Harper & Row, 1974).

45. The obedience experiments by Milgram, ibid., and the prison simulation study by Zimbardo et al., "Psychology of Imprisonment," can serve as illustrations here.

46. It has been suggested, however, that, from a legal point of view, the inconvenience and annoyance caused by such staged events may serve as the basis for legal action against the investigator. See Irwin Silverman, "Nonreactive Methods and the Law," *American Psychologist* 30 (1975): 764-69.

47. Robert Rosenthal and Lenore Jacobson, *Pygmalion in the Classroom: Teacher Expectation and Pupils' Intellectual Development* (New York: Holt, 1968).

48. See Donald T. Campbell, "Prospective: Artifact and Control," in Robert Rosenthal and Ralph L. Rosnow, eds., *Artifact in Behavioral Research* (New York: Academic Press, 1969), p. 371.

49. See Peter G. Brown, "Informed Consent in Social Experimentation: Some Cautionary Notes," in Rivlin and Timpane, *Ethical and Legal Issues*, pp. 94-95.

50. Ibid., pp. 87-89.

51. For additional examples of risks of termination, see ibid., pp. 89-90; and David N. Kershaw, "Comments," in Rivlin and Timpane, *Ethical and Legal Issues*, pp. 61-62.

52. Rossi, Boeckmann, and Berk, "Some Ethical Implications."

53. Donald P. Warwick, "Ethical Guidelines for Social Experiments," in Bermant, Kelman, and Warwick, *Ethics of Social Intervention*, pp. 285-86.

54. Brown, "Informed Consent," pp. 86-90.

55. Alice M. Rivlin and P. Michael Timpane, "Introduction and Summary," in Rivlin and Timpane, *Ethical and Legal Issues*, pp. 12-13.

56. "Ethical Guidelines for Social Experiments," p. 271.

57. Kelman, "Rights of the Subject in Social Research," pp. 1003-5.

58. Alexander Morgan Capron, "Social Experimentation and the Law," in Rivlin and Timpane, *Ethical and Legal Issues*, pp. 155-63.

59. Ibid., pp. 159-60.

60. The issue of consent has also been raised in connection with pyschohistorical or psychobiographical studies—another variety of research that is largely based on personal records and documents but that I see us closer to history and biography than to social science. A task force of the American Psychiatric Association has recommended that informed consent be obtained from the subjects of such studies if they are living, or from their next of kin, if they are recently deceased. "Psychoprofiles" completed by intelligence agencies (particularly the CIA) are apparently exempt "in the service of the national interest." See Philip Nobile, "Psychohistory: A Controversial Discipline," *New York Times*, October 10, 1976. Respectful treatment of the subjects of such research is clearly a matter of professional concern, as is the propriety of clinical analysis in the absence of clinical data. I am not persuaded, however, that the principle of informed consent (with the implication that the biographees or their next of kin have veto power over the work) is applicable when one is writing about public figures on the basis of publicly available records and documents. (The situation is different, of course, if the investigator is given interviews or access to confidential materials.) On the other hand, although I understand why the task force did not expect CIA psychiatrists to obtain consent from the subjects of their psychoprofiles, I would be less inclined to endow their work ("in the national interest") with professional legitimacy.

61. An example here is the use of a periscopic prism for observation in a lavatory in the experiment by Middlemist, Knowles, and Matter, "Personal Space Invasions."

62. Joan Cassell, "Risk and Benefit to Subjects of Fieldwork," *American Sociologist* 13 (1978): 134-43. See also Cassell's chapter in this volume.

63. Arthur J. Vidich and Joseph Bensman, *Small Town in Mass Society* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1960). For a review of some of the issues raised by this study, see Myron Glazer, *The Research Adventure: Promise and Problems of Field Work* (New York: Random House, 1972), pp. 130-34; and Edward Diener and Rick Crandall, *Ethics in Social and Behavioral Research* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), pp. 61-62.

64. These issues are discussed and illustrated by Glazer, *Research Adventure*, chap. 4.

65. Humphreys, *Tearoom Trade*.

66. An early example of research in this genre is Leon Festinger, Henry W. Riecken, and Stanley Schachter, *When Prophecy Fails* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956).

67. For a discussion of these issues see Kai T. Erikson, "A Comment on Disguised Observation in Sociology," *Social Problems* 14 (1967): 366-73; and Cassell's chapter in this volume.

68. Rosenhan, "On Being Sane." Rosenhan's reports did not identify the hospitals in which the research was carried out, but it was probably difficult to protect their anonymity, at least in professional circles.

69. See Kelman, "Rights of the Subject in Social Research," p. 998.

70. See Cassell's chapter in this volume for a very helpful distinction between five models of fieldwork and a discussion of the ways in which what she calls "the undercover agent" model differs from the others.

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid. See also Margaret Mead, "Research with Human Beings: A Model Derived from Anthropological Field Practice," *Daedalus* 98 (1969): 361-86.

73. My assumption here is that the social harm caused by the mere violation of certain rules—the most obvious being the rule against seriously injuring or killing others—always outweighs the potential benefits.

74. Biomedical research in epidemiology may be a good case in point. As Jay W. alluce argues elsewhere in this volume, epidemiological research is closely related to social research.

75. Similarly, at the societal level, the cumulative effect of disrespectful treatment of research participants may be a reduction in the level of trust within the society, constituting a diffuse harm.

76. For an illustration of such an exercise, see Cassell's chapter in this volume, or my own discussion of participatory research models in Kelman, "Rights of the Subject in Social Research," pp. 100ff-5.

77. This analysis suggests that it should be possible to allow exemption from prior review for all research based on the questioning of respondents, *provided* confidentiality of the data is ensured (preferably by the removal of identifying information); and for all research based on direct observation, *provided* there is no deception, misrepresentation, or hidden access. However, I am inclined to agree with Judith Swazey that it would be preferable to make exemptions a category of an expedited review process, since this would make it possible for an IRB to spot the rare case in which the consent procedure is inadequate in a "questioning" study or in which there are serious risks of psychological or material injury in an observation study. See Judith P. Swazey, "Professional Protectionism Rides Again: A Commentary on Exempted Research and Responses to DHEW's Proposed Regulations," *IRB: A Review of Human Subjects Research* 2 (March 1980): 4-6. Prior review is clearly required, in my opinion, for laboratory experiments that involve deception, particularly if they subject participants to a potentially stressful experience; for field experiments, particularly if they involve a highly intrusive and potentially disturbing intervention in a natural situation; and for social and organizational experiments, particularly if access to significant resources and opportunities is at stake (although it may be that the IRB is not the appropriate agency to carry out the review process for large-scale social experiments). An *expedited* review process may be quite appropriate for laboratory experiments and simulations that do not employ deception, and for field experiments that introduce only minor variations in an ongoing activity.

78. Herbert C. Kelman, "Manipulation of Human Behavior: An Ethical Dilemma," in *A Time to Speak*, pp. 13-31.