SOCIAL INFLUENCE AND LINKAGES BETWEEN THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE SOCIAL SYSTEM:

5 *Further Thoughts on the Processes of Compliance, Identification, and Internalization*

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INTRODUCTION

In the early 1950s I developed a theoretical framework for the analysis of social influence, based on a qualitative distinction between three processes of influence: compliance, identification, and internalization. For each of these, a distinct set of antecedents and consequents is postulated. The model is particularly concerned with specifying the conditions under which changes induced by social influence attempts are temporary and superficial and, by contrast, those under which such changes are lasting and integrated into the person's belief and value systems. A summary of the model and of the research based on it was published over ten years ago (Kelman 1961). Several experimental tests of the model have been reported (Kelman 1958; Kelman 1960; Kelman and Cohler 1965; Kelman and Eagly 1965). Furthermore, the model has been extended to the study of attitude-discrepant behavior (Kelman 1962; Kelman, Baron, Sheposh, and Lubalin, forthcoming) and applied to the analysis of influence processes in psychotherapy (Kelman 1963), in international educational exchange (Bailyn and Kelman 1962), and in the integration of individuals into the national system

This paper is a product of a research program on social influence and commitment to social systems, supported by Grant MH-17669-04 from NIMH, United States Public Health Service.

From Perspectives on Social Power (James T. Tedeschi, Editor). Chicago: Aldine, 1974.

(Kelman 1969). A full presentation of the theoretical framework and of the experimental work based on it, however, has not yet appeared in print. Although I had completed a monograph many years ago (Kelman 1956) and even signed a contract to publish it, I was reluctant to let it go to press without making some further revisions and collecting some more data. As a result of this youthful discretion, the monograph remains unpublished to this day.

In the intervening years, I have continued to work on and with the three-process model. I remain committed to its basic outlines (since I obviously cannot afford to change my views too drastically until the book is completed!), but my thinking has developed in a number of directions. In particular, as I shall try to point out in the present paper, I have come to see the three processes of influence as representing different types of linkages between the individual and the social system. When my book finally appears, it will reflect these revisions and extensions of my own thinking--as well as the enormous growth of the literature on social influence and attitude change that has taken place within social psychology. In the meantime, I have taken advantage of the opportunity offered me by the Albany Symposium to present a partial status report on my thinking about the three processes of influence, dwelling especially on some features of the model that have not so far appeared in published form.

To provide a context for my work on social influence, let me note that it began within the experimental tradition of the Yale attitude change program under the direction of Carl Hovland (see, for example, Hovland, Janis, and Kelley 1953). From the very beginning, my own work within the Yale program focused on differences in the nature of changes produced by persuasive communications along a "depth" dimension. Thus, my early experiments were concerned with determinants of public versus private changes (Kelman 1953) and of immediate versus delayed changes (Kelman and Hovland 1953). My concern with the depth of change was reinforced by my interest in developing a model of social influence that would encompass not only the effects of persuasive communications, but also the effects of more powerful influence attempts, such as psychotherapy, brainwashing,

and conversion to social movements. These are the kinds of interests that eventually led me to the distinction between the three processes of influence (having started with a simpler public-private dichotomy), and to the hypotheses specifying their distinct antecedent and consequent conditions.

My approach to social influence is closely linked to two other traditions within social psychology: Lewinian field theory and functional theories of attitudes (Katz 1960; Smith, Bruner, and White 1956). The starting point of my model is an analysis of the influence situation from the point of view of the person being influenced, with special reference to the social norms and the power relationships that characterize that situation for him. This type of analysis has many points of contact with the Lewinian formulations of induced behavior, and especially with the distinction between different bases of power developed by French and Raven (1959). In distinguishing different types of change produced by social influence, the model focuses on the nature of the person's concerns activated in the influence situation--the kinds of motives that are aroused and the specific meaning the situation has for him in view of his efforts at coping with the environment and achieving his goals. Its orientation is, thus, very similar to that of functional theories, such as those of Katz and Smith, which postulate different conditions for attitude change depending on the motivational basis of the attitude to which the influence attempt is directed. However, though my approach is clearly functional and fully compatible with those of Katz and Smith, it draws a different set of qualitative distinctions. Their schemes distinguish the different meanings that attitudes--and hence influence attempts designed to change those attitudes--may have in terms of the different coping processes in which the person may be engaged. My scheme, as I have increasingly come to view it, distinguishes the different meanings that an influence situation may have in terms of the different types of social integration to which the person may be oriented. In other words, the three-process model is very much in the functionalist tradition, in that it focuses on the person's concerns and coping efforts within the influence situation; unlike the other schemes, however, it

is a classification of different types of linkages between individual and social system, rather than of different types of personality functions.

In the present paper I shall attempt to relate the three processes of influence to both a situational and a functional analysis. More specifically, I shall trace the distinction between the three processes to an analysis of the structure of the social influence situation in general. I shall then proceed to illustrate some of the implications of the distinction for the ways in which individuals relate themselves to their various social systems. Before turning to these issues, however, I need to say something about the definition and the scope of social influence, as I use the term.

DEFINITION AND SCOPE OF SOCIAL INFLUENCE

The term social influence is used here to refer to socially induced behavior change. Thus, social influence can be said to have occurred whenever a person (P) *changes* his behavior as a result of *induction* by another person or group (the influencing agent, or O). The terms induction and change, as used in this definition, require some further elaboration.

I will speak of induction whenever O offers or makes available to P some kind of behavior and communicates something about the probable effects of adopting that behavior. In other words, O points a way for P--he provides a direction in terms of which P can then select his own responses. The new behavior made available by O is not necessarily a specific response; it may be a new pattern of behavior which challenges P's existing beliefs and opinions.

Induction may be deliberate and intentional, as in those cases in which O tries to persuade, order, threaten, express expectations to, or provide guidelines to P. On the other hand, induction may also be unintentional to varying degrees, as in the case where O sets an example or serves as a model for P. In the limiting case of unintentional induction, O may serve as a model for P without even knowing of P's existence. Often, induction represents a mixture of intentional and unintentional elements; this would be true, for example, when O is unaware of the extent to which he is directing P's

behavior by subtly communicating his own expectations and preferences.

Induction may take place through direct or symbolic contact with the influencing agent. That is, O may induce behavior in P in the course of face-to-face interaction. Alternatively, induction may occur in the course of P's exposure to mass communications or to various institutional symbols (e.g., a flag, a uniform, an official setting) representing an influencing agent.

We would speak of change as a result of induction to the extent that P's behavior following induction is different from what it would have been in the absence of such induction. Thus, the definition of social influence implies at least some degree of resistance to change that has to be overcome. The degrees of resistance, of course, may vary widely. Phenomenologically, there may be influence situations in which the person experiences no resistance at all; he may, in fact, be eagerly seeking guidance and direction. Even in such cases, however, change implies that O's induction has diverted P's behavior into new directions. Theoretically, therefore, I would conceptualize P's original behavioral tendencies as sources of resistance, even though their competitive strength might be negligible.

Changes resulting from induction may be overt or covert. That is, they may take the form of concrete actions or of new attitudes and beliefs, with the possibility of various combinations of changes at these two levels. Furthermore, changes may be positive or negative. We would speak of positive influence if the individual adopts the induced behavior. Thus, positive influence is the equivalent of conforming behavior, if we use that term in a strictly descriptive sense. Negative influence refers to a change in a direction opposite to that induced by the influencing agent. Negative influence is clearly different from resistance to change, in that P's behavior is very definitely affected by O's induction. In Willis's (1965) terms, negative influence constitutes anticonformity rather than independence. There is also the possibility of changes that are directly stimulated by the induction, but that cannot be characterized as either positive or negative. The induction may lead P to engage in a process of reconsidering his behavior, but the changes re-

sulting from that process may not be clearly related to the direction induced by the influencing agent. Perhaps such changes can be reanalyzed as representing some combination of positive and negative elements, along with elements of independent movement.

Though my definition of social influence is rather broad, it is not intended to cover all changes resulting from social interaction. Thus, for example, I would not consider the acquisition of skills in a particular social learning environment to be an instance of social influence, although attitude changes accompanying this process would clearly fall within my definition. Similarly, I would not view the moment-to-moment adjustments in behavior that people make in the course of any social interaction--in the interest of both effective communication and impression management --as instances of social influence. Many of the changes that I would exclude from my definition could probably be analyzed in social influence terms, but a social influence model would not be particularly useful for these purposes. Other models--such as a social learning model for analyzing the acquisition of skills or Goffman's (1959) dramaturgical model for analyzing self-presentation in social interaction--would probably be more parsimonious. A social influence model of the type that I am proposing is likely to be useful only if the following conditions are met:

(1) There is some meaningful connection--recognized in the wider society--between the induced behavior and the influencing agent. The agent is not just transmitting stimuli or reinforcers but is inducing behavior that is in some way linked to him--that represents him, or is tied to his values, or reflects his expectations. Social influence therefore represents an aspect of the relationship between P and O within a social system in which both occupy specified positions. The nature of O's role and of P's role relationship to him have a direct bearing on the meaning of the induced behavior. In this sense, the transmission of information and skills would not represent an instance of social influence, but the transmission of an attitude about such information and skills would.

(2) There is a clear induction. O is not merely providing the stimulus for some new behavior by P but

is actually making such behavior available to P--he is pointing a direction for him. Take, for example, an interaction situation in which P has said or done something inappropriate and O has somehow communicated to him what behavior is expected in this situation. P may respond immediately by engaging in various maneuvers designed to save face, to reduce embarrassment, and to ingratiate himself. He may also develop a new view of the norms governing the situation and change his behavior accordingly. The latter response would clearly meet my conditions for a social influence analysis, while the former would not.

(3) The behavior change resulting from the interaction is relatively gross. It represents a learning that the person carries away with him from the interaction situation rather than a moment-to-moment adjustment within that situation. This does not necessarily mean that the change is highly durable or generalized; it may vary considerably along these dimensions. It simply means that the focus of the analysis is on exportable products of the interaction, in the form of norms, expectations, attitudes, opinions, or action preferences.

THE STRUCTURE OF A SOCIAL INFLUENCE SITUATION

In keeping with the definition of social influence that I have just presented, we can describe an influence situation--in its most general form--as one in which an influencing agent offers some new behavior to a person and communicates to him, in some fashion, that adoption of this behavior will have certain implications for the achievement of his goals. Presumably, P will be positively influenced if he anticipates that adoption of the induced behavior is likely to facilitate goal achievement. He will be negatively influenced if he anticipates that a behavior contrary to that induced is likely to facilitate goal achievement. What can we say about the characteristics of an influence situation that is conducive to such outcomes?

My answer to this question is diagramed in figure 5.1, which represents the structure of a social influence situation as seen from P's point of view. The situation depicted in the diagram is one that culmi-



FIGURE 5.1. Diagram of the Structure of a Social Influence Situation

The situation depicted culminates in positive influence, i.e., acceptance of induced behavior.

nates in positive influence. A comparable diagram could be constructed for the case of negative influence. However, since my work so far has largely focused on positive influence, most of my discussion will deal with that case. The diagram applies to unintentional as well as intentional induction, although--for the sake of convenience--I shall sometimes refer to what an influencing agent would have to do if he wanted to facilitate positive influence.

The diagram is based on the assumption that three things must happen in an influence situation if positive influence is to take place: (1) A goal important to P must be activated, so that he will be responsive to the induction and expose himself to it. (2) P must perceive O as having some relevance to the achievement of the goal that has been activated, so that he will be positively oriented to an induction coming from O. (3) The specific behavior induced has to constitute a sufficiently "distinguished path," so that P will select it in preference to other response alternatives available to him. All three of these conditions are necessary for the occurrence of positive influence. If no important goal is activated, P lacks the motivation to search for new behavior and is unlikely, therefore, to expose himself to the induction. If an important goal is activated, but P perceives O as irrelevant to the achievement of that goal, he lacks the motivation to accept O's induction and is likely to turn elsewhere in his search for new behavior. If both the first and the second conditions are met, then there is sufficient motivation to accept the induced behavior. This motivation is not likely to be translated into specific action, however, unless the third condition is met as well--i.e., the induced behavior stands out relative to the other behavioral options.

Let us examine figure 5.1 in more detail. The left-hand side of the diagram (i.e., the portion to the left of the vertical broken line) sketches out what actually happens in the influence situation from P's point of view. The boxes represent the different kinds of information with which the situation provides P; roughly speaking, they can be characterized as stimulus elements. The channels represent P's responses to the information. The diagram specifies three kinds of informational input:

(1) *Definition of the situation.* Through deliberate efforts by the influencing agent and/or through other features of the influence situation, P is informed about the nature of the situation in which he finds himself and, more particularly, about what is at stake for him in this situation. Typically, in a deliberate influence attempt, the influencing agent tries to present an effective challenge to P's existing beliefs, attitudes, or actions--to show that these are not maximally conducive to the achievement of P's goals. More often than not, such a challenge takes the form of bringing some discrepancy to P's awareness--a discrepancy between P's beliefs or attitudes and the evidence of reality, or between P's own attitudes and the attitudes of important others, or between P's attitudes and his own actions. If the challenge is successful, then P will be motivated to reconsider his current behavior. In the search for alternative approaches, he will be ready to expose himself to the induction as a possible source of new directions. If the challenge is unsuccessful--if P remains unconvinced that important goals are at stake in the situation--then he will be inclined to leave the field. The broken-lined channel leading out of the first box in the diagram represents the latter case. That is, the influence situation fails to culminate in positive influence because P has not been motivated to expose himself to the induction; in other words, he has been "lost" to the influence attempt at this initial point.

(2) *Presentation of the agent.* The influence situation conveys to P--deliberately or otherwise--information about the characteristics of the influencing agent. This information may refer to O's status, prestige, special knowledge or expertise, group membership, representativeness of certain points of view, control of certain resources, ability to apply sanctions, or the like. In a deliberate influence attempt, this information is designed to demonstrate, in a way maximally persuasive to P, that what O says or does may have considerable relevance to P's goal achievement. If this communication is successful, then P will be inclined to give serious consideration to behavioral possibilities that O makes available to him--in other words, he will be positively oriented to O's induction. If the communication is un-

successful--if P remains unconvinced that O is relevant to the achievement of his (P's) goals--then he will turn elsewhere for direction and remain uninfluenced by O's induction. If P is convinced that O is detrimental to the achievement of his goals (e.g., because O represents a negative reference group or a hated ideology, or because he is publicly identified with illegal or socially disapproved activities), then he may actually be influenced in a negative direction. The broken-lined channel leading out of the second box in the diagram represents failures in positive influence arising from the fact that P has not been persuaded to orient himself positively to the influencing agent. This is the second point, then, at which P may be lost to the influence attempt.

(3) *Specification of the response.* The influence situation conveys to P the precise nature of the response that is being induced and facilitates the performance of that response. In other words, the induced behavior is made readily available to P, both perceptually and behaviorally. In a deliberate influence attempt, the influencing agent would try to demonstrate the unique relevance of that response (in contrast to various other possible alternatives) to P's goal achievement. He would try to reduce whatever ambiguities might arise about the form and content of that response, to overcome P's resistances to performing the response, and to find ways of easing P into performance of the response (e.g., through social facilitation, step-by-step involvement, or limited commitment). If these efforts are successful, then P will be both willing and able to adopt the induced behavior. If the efforts are unsuccessful--if the form and content of the behavior remain ambiguous or resistances to its performance have not been overcome--then P is likely to opt for one of the alternative courses of action available to him. The broken-lined channel leading out of the third box in the diagram represents this particular possibility of "losing" P to the influence attempt. That is, even though P may be motivated to expose himself to the induction and positively oriented to the influencing agent, the influence situation will fail to culminate in positive influence unless the induced behavior has been transformed into a "distinguished path."

In sum, the left-hand side of the diagram tells us that positive influence occurs if the situation is so defined that P exposes himself to induction, if the influencing agent is so presented that P is positively oriented to him, and if the induced behavior is so specified and facilitated that P is willing and able to adopt it in the face of various competing alternatives. To represent the psychological prerequisites for exposure, positive orientation, and adoption of the induced behavior, we turn to the right-hand side of the diagram, which depicts P's perception of the situation and his anticipation of consequences. Taken by itself, the right-hand side of the diagram simply says that P will adopt the induced behavior if he sees it as meeting the conditions for achieving a goal that he positively values. Taken together, the two sides of the diagram--linked by a series of arrows in both directions--portray the structure of a social influence situation culminating in positive influence: (1) The situation is defined as one in which a goal that P presumably wishes to achieve is at stake (arrow from left to right); if P is convinced that the situation is indeed relevant to that goal and if the goal is sufficiently important to him, then he will expose himself to the induction (arrow from right to left). (2) The influencing agent is presented as one who is instrumental to the conditions for goal achievement (arrow from left to right); if P is persuaded that O is indeed in a position to facilitate or impede his goal achievement, then he will be positively oriented to O's induction (arrow from right to left). (3) The induced response is specified as the precise behavior required to meet the conditions for goal achievement (arrow from left to right); if P perceives that response as distinctive, readily performable, and uniquely relevant to the conditions for goal achievement, then he will indeed adopt it (arrow from right to left).

There is no assumption that the different steps culminating in positive influence must occur in the order that I have described and depicted in the diagram. For analytical purposes, the steps represent a logical sequence, but in any given influence situation they may occur in various orders and combinations. The same feature of the influence situation, the same action or com-

munication by the influencing agent, or--in the laboratory--the same manipulation by the experimenter may simultaneously generate two or more of the necessary inputs. The only point is that, in some order and in some fashion, all three conditions--activation of an important goal, perception of the influencing agent as relevant to goal achievement, and transformation of the induced behavior into a distinguished path--must be present for positive influence to occur.

This analysis also provides a systematic basis for specifying alternative modes of reaction in the absence of positive influence (comparable to the alternative modes of resolving inconsistency or reducing dissonance that the various consistency theories have proposed). Different types of reaction are likely to come into play, depending on the particular condition for positive influence that the situation failed to meet. Thus, if the situation failed to activate an important goal, the alternative reaction may take the form of minimizing the issue. If it failed to present the influencing agent as sufficiently relevant to P's goal achievement, then the alternative reaction may take the form of dismissing the agent, of derogating his message, or--in special cases--of anticonformity. If it failed to transform the induced response into a distinguished path, the alternative reaction may take the form of misperceiving or misinterpreting the message or of some other type of avoidance mechanism.

If we reformulate the three conditions for positive influence in terms of dimensions, we come up with what I would propose as the three basic determinants of the probability of influence: the relative importance of the induction, the relative power of the influencing agent, and the prepotency of the induced behavior. These three variables--or, more accurately, classes of variables--are represented in figure 5.1 by the arrows moving from the right to the left.

(1) The importance of the induction refers to the extent to which P views the influence situation as having motivational significance for him--i.e., the extent to which the situation has activated goals important to P, relative to the other goals that he is currently pursuing (and that he may have to sacrifice or at least postpone by changing his behavior). The importance of

the induction depends, first of all, on the strength of the motives that have been aroused in the situation. Second, it depends on the perceived relevance of the situation to these motives. The more important the induction--i.e., the stronger the motives activated and the more relevant the situation to their satisfaction--the greater P's *responsiveness* to communications offering him new behavioral options. The probability of *acceptance* of O's particular induction depends on P's perception of O's power.

(2) The power of the influencing agent--with respect to a particular P--refers to the extent to which P perceives him as instrumental to the achievement of his goals. Thus, O possesses power over P insofar as he is in a position to affect--to facilitate or impede --P's goal achievement. The power of the influencing agent over P depends on two factors. The first is his capacity to control some of the conditions for P's goal achievement, which might take the form, for example, of controlling resources that P desires, or having the right to apply certain sanctions, or possessing expert knowledge that P would find useful in solving his problems. The second factor is the perceived likelihood that O will in fact use the capacities he has in ways that would affect P's goal achievement, which involves an assessment of O's motives and intentions--as reflected in such characteristics as his manipulativeness, his ruthlessness, and his trustworthiness. The greater O's power--in terms of his perceived capacity and intention to affect P's goal achievement--relative to the perceived power of competing influencing agents (including P himself), the greater the likelihood that P will accept his induction. It should be noted that I am defining power independently of influence. Power, in my scheme, is a basic determinant of influence, but it is defined and assessed, not in terms of ability to influence, but in terms of the relationship between P and O. Although propositions about the effects of power refer to O's power as perceived by P, it is possible to link O's power systematically to his objective characteristics and his position within the social system relative to that of P.

(3) The prepotency of the induced behavior refers to the extent to which that behavior emerges as most

clearly relevant in the context of the motivations that have been activated in the situation. The assumption is that, even though P may be motivated to accept the induced behavior, he may select one of a number of alternative courses of action that are generally available to him. He may do so either because he is uncertain about the exact nature of the induced behavior, or because he considers some of the alternatives equally effective, or because he finds the induced behavior excessively difficult or unpleasant. In short, resistances to the induced behavior may enter both at the point of perception and at the point of action. The likelihood that a specific induced behavior will be accepted depends on the extent to which that behavior has become prepotent--i.e., relatively stronger than the various available alternatives. The induced behavior becomes prepotent to the extent to which it is strengthened within the influence situation--for example, by making the response itself more distinctive, by linking it clearly to the conditions for goal achievement, by minimizing discomforts that inhibit its performance, by structuring the situation so that the person is gradually eased into performing it, by socially facilitating performance of the response, or by introducing situational demands and pressures that can best be met by performing the induced response. Induced behavior also becomes prepotent to the extent that competing responses are weakened or eliminated in the situation--for example, by increasing the overall ambiguity of the situation, by demonstrating the ineffectiveness or counterproductiveness of these responses for the achievement of P's goals, by blocking performance of such responses or making it uncomfortable, or by making it difficult for P to engage in evasive maneuvers or to leave the field. Typically, prepotency is achieved through some combination of strengthening the induced behavior and weakening alternatives--for example, by making apparent the special advantages of that behavior relative to various other options.

I have spoken of the importance of the induction, the power of the influencing agent, and the prepotency of the induced behavior as classes of variables because there are numerous forms that each of these variables may take. By the same token, there are many ways in

which each may be operationalized in experimental studies. In one or another operational form, these three variables typically constitute the independent variables in experimental research on social influence (i.e., in studies in which the dependent variable is some form of attitude or behavior change). In many cases, the experimental manipulation clearly represents a variation of importance, or power, or prepotency. In other cases, however, a single operational variable may vary two or all three of the conceptual variables simultaneously. This is true not only for such complex operational variables as group decision versus lecture, but even for such deceptively simple ones as size of the majority in a group pressure situation or distance between the communicator's and subject's positions in a persuasion experiment. Sometimes, these multiple effects reinforce each other; for example, the same operation may increase the power of the agent as well as the prepotency of the response, both of which are positively related to the probability of influence. At other times, however, the multiple effects of an operation may work against one another in that they are related in opposite ways to the dependent variable of social influence. For example, one might propose that increasing the distance between the communicator's and the subject's positions increases the prepotency of the induced behavior but decreases the power of the influencing agent. This kind of analysis may help to explain the curvilinear relationships between distance and influence that have sometimes been found, and to reconcile some of the contradictory results of different experiments on this problem. In short, even though the three variables are not always independent of one another, their conceptual separation may be very useful for analytic purposes.

In reviewing the literature eighteen years ago (Kelman 1956), I was able to cite various experiments showing the expected relationship between some operationalization of importance, power, or prepotency and the probability of positive influence. Many more such confirming experiments could be cited today. I attach very little importance, however, to the confirmation of these relationships per se at the very general level at which I have presented them so far. Although they are stated in the form of propositions, I really see them as more

in the nature of assumptions. Based on a logical analysis of the generic structure of an influence situation, they are designed to help us identify and organize the variables that are operative in any particular type of influence situation. Thus, the interesting propositions from a social psychological point of view are those concerned with the specific forms that the variables might take and their relationship to social influence under varying conditions. For example, within my scheme, variations in the ambiguity of the stimulus context in an influence situation can be conceptualized as variations in the prepotency of the induced behavior. The social psychological significance of an experiment in this area, however, does not rest on what it tells us about the relationship between prepotency and influence, but on what it tells us about the role of ambiguity in social influence and particularly about the specific conditions under which it is or is not a major determining factor.

From my own point of view, the major interest of the scheme presented in figure 5.1 is that it serves as a starting point for qualitative distinctions between different types of influence situations. Specifically, influence situations culminating in compliance, in identification, and in internalization represent variants of the generic situation depicted in the figure. They involve the same steps and the same classes of variables, but differ in the specific forms that these take. Thus, it is possible to represent a compliance situation, an identification situation, and an internalization situation by means of separate diagrams similar in general outline to the diagram presented in figure 5.1 but differing in some of the specific contents. In short, the value of the generic scheme is that it serves as a framework for distinguishing the three processes and for comparing them with one another.

CONCEPTUAL STATUS OF THE THREE PROCESSES OF INFLUENCE

I shall not describe the three processes of influence in detail, as fuller information is available elsewhere (Kelman 1961), and will address myself instead to the conceptual status of the processes. However, a very

brief description of the three processes might be useful at this point:

> Compliance can be said to occur when an individual accepts influence from another person or from a group in order to attain a favorable reaction from the other, that is, to gain a specific reward or avoid a specific punishment controlled by the other, or to gain approval or avoid disapproval from him. Identification can be said to occur when an individual accepts influence from another person or a group in order to establish or maintain a satisfying self-defining relationship to the other. In contrast to compliance, identification is not primarily concerned with producing a particular effect in the other. Rather, accepting influence through identification is a way of establishing or maintaining a desired relationship to the other, as well as the self-definition that is anchored in this relationship. By accepting influence, the person is able to see himself as similar to the other (as in classical identification) or to see himself as enacting a role reciprocal to that of the other. Finally, internalization can be said to occur when an individual accepts influence in order to maintain the congruence of his actions and beliefs with his value system. Here it is the content of the induced behavior and its relation to the person's value system that are intrinsically satisfying (Kelman 1963, p. 400).

Each of these three processes is characterized by a distinct set of antecedent and consequent conditions, which are summarized in table 5.1. On the antecedent side, I am proposing (as can be seen from the table) that qualitative features of the influence situation will determine which process is likely to be brought into play. Thus, to the extent that P's primary concern in the situation is with the social effect of his behavior, that O's power is based largely on his means-control (i.e., his ability to supply or withhold material or psychological resources on which P's goal achievement depends), and that the induction techniques used are designed to limit P's choices, influence is likely to

take the form of compliance. To the extent that P's primary concern in the situation is with the social anchorage of his behavior, that O's power is based largely on his attractiveness (i.e., his possession of qualities that make a continued relationship to him particularly desirable), and that the induction techniques used serve to delineate the requirements of a role relationship in which P's self-definition is anchored (e.g., the expectations of a relevant reference group), influence is likely to take the form of identification. To the extent that P's primary concern in the situation is with the value congruence of his behavior, that O's power is based largely on his credibility (i.e., his expertness and trustworthiness), and that the induction techniques used are designed to reorganize P's means-ends framework (i.e., his conception of the paths toward maximizing his values), influence is likely to take the form of internalization.

Each of the three processes generated by its respective set of antecedents corresponds to a characteristic pattern of thoughts and feelings in which P engages while adopting the induced behavior. Consequently, the nature of the changes produced by each of the three processes tends to be different. In other words, I am postulating a qualitative distinction between the three processes in terms of their consequents, as well as in terms of their antecedents (see lower half of table 5.1). The crucial difference between the three processes on the consequent side is in the conditions under which the newly acquired behavior is likely to manifest itself. Behavior accepted through compliance tends to manifest itself only under conditions of surveillance by the influencing agent, i.e., only when P's behavior is directly or indirectly observable by O. Identification-based behavior, though independent of observability, tends to manifest itself only under conditions of salience of P's relationship to O, i.e., only in situations in which P's role is somehow associated with O. Identification-based behavior is designed to meet O's expectations for P's own role performance and, therefore, remains tied to the external source and dependent on social support. Behavior adopted through internalization, by contrast, tends to be integrated with P's existing values, thus becoming part of a per-

TABLE 5.1. Summary of the Distinctions between the Three Processes*

	Compliance	*Identification*	*Internalization*
Antecedents:			
1. Basis for the *importance of the induction*	Concern with social effect of behavior	Concern with social anchorage of behavior	Concern with value congruence of behavior
2. Source of *power of the influencing agent*	Means-control	Attractiveness	Credibility
3. Manner of achieving *prepotency of the induced response*	Limitation of choice behavior	Delineation of role requirements	Reorganization of means-ends framework

Consequents:

1. Conditions of performance of induced response	Surveillance by influencing agent	Salience of relationship to agent	Relevance of values to issue
2. Conditions of change and extinction of induced response	Changed perception of conditions for social rewards	Changed perception of conditions for satisfying self-defining relationships	Changed perception of conditions for value maximization
3. Type of behavior system in which induced response is embedded	External demands of a specific setting	Expectations defining a specific role	Person's value system

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sonal system, as distinguished from a system of social-role expectations. It depends neither on surveillance nor on salience, but tends to manifest itself whenever the values on which it is based are relevant to the issue at hand (although it does not always prevail in the face of competing demands, of course). Internalized behavior becomes independent of the original source and, because of the resulting interplay with other parts of P's value system, it tends to be more idiosyncratic, more flexible, and more complex.

Returning to the upper half of table 5.1, we can now see quite clearly the relationship between the three processes and the generic model of social influence depicted in the diagram. The probability of each process can be stated as a function of the basic determinants of influence derived from the diagram: the importance of the induction, the power of the influencing agent, and the prepotency of the induced behavior. Moreover, for each process, the magnitude of these determinants may vary over the entire range; that is, each may be generated by inductions with varying degrees of importance, by influencing agents with varying degrees of power, and by induced responses with varying degrees of prepotency. The processes differ only in terms of the *qualitative* form that these determinants take--in terms of the *basis* for the importance of the induction, the *source* of the influencing agent's power, and the *manner* of achieving prepotency of the induced response. These differences in turn make for qualitative differences in the induced behavior and in the nature of the resulting changes.

The generic model of social influence with which I started involves conceptualization at the level of social interaction. It focuses on what happens in the influence situation proper, and its basic variables try to capture the interactions between the participants in that situation. Yet, the independent variables of the model, though stated at the level of social interaction, have very definite referents to social system processes. This is particularly evident when we move from generic description of the determinants of influence to postulation of the distinct qualitative forms these determinants take when applied to the three processes.

Thus, the different bases for the importance of the induction postulated by the model can be analyzed in terms of P's relationship to the social system. Concern with the social effect, the social anchorage, and the value congruence of one's behavior represent different ways of worrying about one's integration in the social system. In the first case, P is concerned with how adequately he conforms to the rules of the system; in the second, with how securely he is embedded in one of his roles within the system; and in the third, with how fully he lives up to system values that he shares. Similarly, the different sources of power of the influencing agent postulated by the model can be analyzed in terms of the relationship between P and O in the larger social system, going beyond the immediate influence situation. Thus, means-control may refer to those agents whom P perceives to be in a position to allocate the system's resources and to apply its sanctions; attractiveness, to those in a position to define the requirements of being a good system member; and credibility, to those in a position to assess the system's needs in terms of its underlying ideology and long-term goals. The different ways of achieving prepotency of the induced behavior are most clearly at the level of social interaction, since they refer to the specific induction technique used in the influence situation. Yet, even here, the use of different induction techniques may be related to different functions of the social system. Thus, limitation of choice behavior may occur most readily in the context of the allocation of resources and the application of sanctions; delineation of role requirements, in the context of mobilizing support for the system; and reorganization of means-ends conceptions, in the context of setting and evaluating system goals.

Considerations such as these have increasingly led me to the conviction that social influence processes can be conceptualized most fruitfully in terms of the social systems within which they are generated and to which a person's acceptance of influence is directed. Thus, the three processes of influence, when viewed within the context of a particular social system, represent three ways in which P may be linked to the sys-

tem--three ways in which he meets the demands of the system and maintains his personal integration in it. Each process refers to a distinct component of the social system that generates standards for the behavior of individual members and provides a vehicle for their integration in the system. Acceptance of influence is equivalent to meeting the standards set by a particular component of the system and protecting one's integration in the system by this particular route.

Specifically, compliance relates to integration through the rules or norms of the system, i.e., the behavioral requirements that it sets for its members. In accepting influence by this process, P is meeting the system's normative demands--adhering to its rules--and thus assuring himself of continued access to rewards or approval (or avoidance of punishment or disapproval) that depend on adherence to these rules. Identification relates to integration through system roles in which P's self-definition is anchored. Integration at this level implies not just adhering to the set of behavioral requirements associated with the role, but seeing oneself fully in possession of the role. In accepting influence by this process, P is meeting the expectations of the role and thus assuring maintenance of the desired relationship to the system and the self-definition anchored in it. Internalization relates to integration through values of the system that the individual personally shares. In accepting influence by this process, P is living up to the implications of these shared social values and thus maintaining the integrity of his personal value system. In short, viewed in terms of the linkages of the individual to the social system, compliance refers to integration via adherence to rules, identification to integration via involvement in roles, and internalization to integration via sharing of values.

This formulation of the three processes is not a drastic departure from the original model. It was actually implicit in the model from the beginning, but no explicit attempts were made to link processes of interpersonal influence to properties of the social system. Even with the present emphasis, the model continues to conceptualize influence from the standpoint of P; it continues to focus on P's motivational and coping processes and to subject these to a functional analysis;

it still requires observation of behavior at the micro-level and detailed analysis of the social actions and interactions that mediate personal change. The only difference is that the motivational patterns that the model distinguishes are now clearly defined in terms of the different linkages to the social system that they represent. Similarly, the actions and the interactions in the influence situation are viewed in terms of their larger system context; that is, certain system demands help to define the dimensions of the influence situation, and the behavior of the individuals in that situation in turn has a bearing on the functioning of the larger system.

A special advantage of conceptualizing social influence in terms of properties of the social system is that it helps to bridge analyses of social influence with analyses of social control. Both are concerned with linkages between the social system and the individual, except that social control analyzes these from the system point of view, while social influence analyzes them from the point of view of the individual. More generally, social influence approached in this way may help to bridge a microanalysis of social behavior with a macroanalysis. This kind of model may be helpful in conceptualizing individual functioning as it affects system functioning--i.e., in clarifying the ways in which the integration of individuals into the system affects the integration and effective functioning of the system itself, and the ways in which individual change affects social change. Conversely, such a model may be helpful in conceptualizing the ways in which the structure and institutional patterns of the system (or changes in these) affect the integration and functioning of its individual members.

DISCREPANT ACTION AS DEVIATION FROM SOCIETAL STANDARDS

To illustrate some of the ramifications of the three processes of social influence, conceptualized in terms of linkages between the individual and the social system, let me turn to a problem that has been of central concern to experimental social psychologists: reactions to discrepant (or counterattitudinal) behavior.

For several years, my colleagues and I have been applying a functional analysis to some of the phenomena to which dissonance theory and other consistency models have addressed themselves. Basic to our approach has been the attempt to distinguish qualitatively different dilemmas that discrepant action might bring into play. We assume that contemplation of a discrepant act arouses different concerns in individuals, depending on the nature of the standards from which this action has deviated and the nature of the action itself. The particular concern that is aroused, in turn, sets different psychological processes into motion and leads to different ways of handling the dilemma. That is, "modes of resolution" of inconsistency dilemmas are not interchangeable, in our view, but are systematically related to the particular dilemma with which the person is confronted (Kelman and Baron 1968). Some of our studies (Kelman, Baron, Sheposh, and Lubalin, forthcoming) have distinguished, for example, between moral and hedonic dilemmas, and predicted that the nature of the emotional reactions aroused and of the modes of resolution utilized will be different for these different dilemmas, and that various situational variables (e.g., incentives for the discrepant action) will be differentially related to the strength of arousal and resolution in these two types of situations.

We have regarded the moral-hedonic distinction, and others suggested by our research, merely as initial probes toward a more systematic typology of concerns created by discrepant action. It now seems to me that the three-process model of social influence, particularly when it is coordinated with properties of the social system, may be a useful starting point for such a typology. Table 5.2 presents the form of the typology as I currently envision it. The table classifies types of discrepant action in terms of the societal standards from which they depart. The rows of the table represent the sources of the standards from which the person's action has departed; the columns represent the behavioral dimensions on which the deviation from standards has occurred; and the cell entries suggest the dominant emotional reactions aroused in the person by each of the six types of deviation.[1]

TABLE 5.2. A Classification of Types of Discrepant Action in Terms of the Societal Standards from Which They Depart*

Source of Standards from Which P's Action Has Departed	*Behavioral Dimension on Which P's Departure from Societal Standards Has Occurred*	
	Responsibility	*Propriety*
External rules or norms (compliance-based)	Social fear	Embarrassment
Role expectations (identification-based)	Guilt	Shame
Social values (internalized)	Regret	Self-Disappointment

*Cell entries refer to the dominant emotional reactions that each type of discrepant action is hypothesized to arouse.

The three sources of the standards, distinguished by the rows of the table, are old acquaintances. At the level of the individual, they refer to the social influence process by which P originally adopted the standards (acquired the attitudes) that his discrepant action has now violated. In other words, the first row refers to actions that deviate from compliance-based expectations, the second row to actions deviating from identification-based expectations, and the third row to actions deviating from internalized expectations. At the level of the social system, the three sources of standards refer to three components of the system in which standards might be embedded. These are, of course, the system components to which I have tried to coordinate the three processes of influence: rules or norms, role expectations, and social values. The original distinctions between compliance, identification, and internalization readily suggest hypotheses about P's reactions to his deviation in each of the three rows. Thus, in the first row, we would expect P to be primarily concerned with the way others may react to his deviation; in the second row, he will be primarily concerned with the implications of the deviation for his relationship to groups in which his self-definition is anchored; in the third row, he will be primarily concerned with the intrinsic implications of his action, matched against his personal value system.

The behavioral dimensions within which P may deviate from societal standards--as distinguished in the columns of the table--are socially defined and monitored. Each of these dimensions refers to a domain of individual behavior in which society has a definite stake and in which it takes considerable interest, although different societies may give different degrees of emphasis to one or another dimension. The societal standards associated with each domain may be represented at different levels (compliance, identification, or internalization) in a given individual's cognitive structure, depending in part on the nature of his socialization experiences. For each dimension, qualitatively different patterns of socialization and means of social control tend to be utilized. Table 5.2 presents two such dimensions--corresponding to guiltlike and shamelike reactions, respectively--but it may well be possible to distinguish additional dimensions.

The first column refers to discrepant actions that depart from societal standards of responsibility (or morality). Most typically, these involve actions that cause harm to others, or to society in general (e.g., by wasting valuable resources or failing to do productive work). Actions causing harm to the self (e.g., by excessive use of drugs or alcohol, or by dissipating one's energies) also tend to be treated as departures from standards of responsibility, perhaps because they are seen as wasting human resources on which society might otherwise have been able to draw. The domain of responsibility is one in which "society" insists on the right to make each member answerable (i.e., responsible) to it for his actions. The social controls that are typically exercised in this domain of behavior involve punishment or the threat of punishment, exclusion from "responsible" roles in the society, and disapproval in the form of anger.

The second column refers to actions that deviate from societal standards of propriety. Typically, these are actions by P that are deemed inappropriate (i.e., not "his own") for a person in his position--or, in many cases, for any adult in the society. P has thus failed to live up to a particular personal image, whether it be a strictly public image, or a self-image, or a self-image dependent on public confirmation. He is not accountable for his actions in the same formal sense as he would be for behavior in the domain of responsibility, but behavior in the domain of propriety is also subject to social controls. "Society" has an interest in assuring that its members live up to their images, since smooth and predictable interactions depend upon their doing so. The social controls that are typically exercised in this domain involve ridicule, ostracism, and disapproval in the form of contempt.

Each of the six types of discrepant action distinguished in table 5.2 should produce a distinct pattern of reactions, predictable from the particular intersection of row and column that it represents. First of all, a violation of societal standards will arouse qualitatively different concerns and emotional responses in P, depending on the socially defined domain whose standards he violated and the level at which he had originally adopted those standards. Second, depending on the type of discrepant action involved, P will go about

handling the concerns and resolving the tensions aroused in different ways. Thus, for each cell it should be possible to specify what P is likely to do when he finds himself deviating from societal standards--both to avoid or minimize the consequences of his deviation, and to rectify the situation and come to grips with it psychologically. Let us look at some of the reactions that characterize each of the cells, starting with those in the domain of responsibility.

(1) *Social fear.* In this cell, P's primary concern is with the way in which others will react to his deviation--with the social consequences of his discrepant action. He seeks to avoid or minimize the punishment and disapproval that his action may bring about. Thus, insofar as possible, he tries to hide or cover up what he has done in order to evade discovery. If he has been discovered, he tries to deny responsibility for the action. His efforts to hide or deny the action may take the form of somehow demonstrating that he is not the type of person who would do such things. If he fails in his efforts to evade discovery or deny responsibility, he engages in maneuvers designed to minimize the severity of the consequences. He introduces extenuating circumstances that would reduce the level of his responsibility--e.g., by showing that his action was inadvertent, or that it was taken under orders, or that it caused only minor harm. He may apologize to the person he has harmed as a way of ingratiating himself with the other and thus mitigating the punishment that the other might administer or demand. He may also confess his misdeeds, again as a way of manipulating the reactions of others; confession tends to soften the social response to deviation, since the person has demonstrated a sense of responsibility and acknowledged the validity of the standards that he has violated.

(2) *Guilt.* My use of this term is somewhat restricted, though quite consistent with its usage in the psychoanalytic literature and elsewhere. I am excluding what is sometimes called "real" guilt or "existential" guilt (in contrast to "neurotic" guilt)--in other words, a concern with the object that has been harmed and the value that has been violated. I leave this kind of reaction to the third cell in this column. In the second cell, the person is concerned with his relationship to the social system and his self-definition

within it. His deviation has thrown this relationship into question and undermined his self-concept as a well-integrated, securely positioned member of his society. The core meaning of this reaction is very well conveyed by the German word *Schuld*, which means both guilt and debt. Through his deviant action, P has incurred a debt to the one he harmed and, most importantly, to society. To deal with the consequences of the deviation, he must find ways of reinstating himself in the social order, of reestablishing his desired relationship to it. One accepted way of accomplishing this is through compensation of his victim; the form of such compensation is socially defined and often publicly administered. Other types of expiation and reparation are equally effective in allowing P to "pay his debt to society." In short, guilt is often resolved through the use of an accounting system which allows the person to make up for his deviation and regain his place in society. Confession represents another way of dealing with guilt, although in the present case (in contrast to the case of social fear) it is designed not merely to manipulate the reactions of others, but to restore one's own position in society. Confession is a form of expiation, in that the person humbles himself; it is a renewed commitment to the standards that were violated; and it is a way of separating the transgressing self from the normal self. It is important to keep in mind that in the case of guilt P is not just concerned with being restored to the good graces of others, but with reestablishing his own self-definition as a worthy member of society. Though the standards he has violated are external, they function in a way similar to that suggested by Freud's (e.g., 1933) concept of the superego, which represents an introjection of parental authority. In keeping with the notion that the superego may be quite rigid and severe, guilt may create a considerable amount of inner turmoil. The person may see his deviation as so unacceptable that he despairs of the possibility of reestablishing the desired relationship to the society. In such cases, the reaction to the deviation may take the form of varying degrees of self-punishment.

(3) *Regret.* The societal standards of responsibility violated by P in this cell are integral parts of his personal system of values. In keeping with these

values, he is primarily concerned with the object that he has harmed by his discrepant action. In terms of longer-run considerations, he is also likely to be concerned about the implications of his action for his ability to live up to his values. One reaction characteristic of this cell is to seek ways of correcting the wrong that has been done--not simply in the sense of compensating the injured party in terms of a socially established formula, but in the sense of exploring all necessary steps for counteracting and minimizing the harmful consequences of the action. Another type of reaction in this cell is repentance, which involves not only remorse for the wrong that has been done, but also a resolution to avoid similar actions in the future. In making such a resolution, P may engage in a process of self-examination in order to understand why he failed to live up to his own values and to determine how he might want to change himself.

The three cells in the first column can be seen as representing stages in moral development quite compatible with the three levels and six stages of moral development identified by Kohlberg (1969). I do not suggest that each individual can be placed in one of the three boxes with respect to his moral behavior. I assume that each individual may operate at different levels depending on the particular behavior involved; for example, he may be only complying to the norms about cheating, but he may have internalized standards of loyalty to one's friends. Even with respect to the same specific behavior, a person may operate at different levels on different occasions. Nevertheless, I would view the three cells as constituting a developmental sequence in the course of childhood socialization, with definite implications for future performance. Thus, the child first adopts behavior in keeping with standards of responsibility through compliance; what he learns at this stage is to discriminate social cues for reward and punishment. He moves to identification initially for instrumental reasons: by taking the parent's role in his absence, he can predict more accurately what behavior is likely to be punished. Taking the parent's role may turn out to be satisfying in its own right, by giving him a vicarious sense of power and efficacy, and thus identification may enter into his re-

pertoire. He may then find that items of moral behavior that he has adopted through identification are intrinsically desirable in terms of his evolving personal style, and these may then be internalized. Not all individuals, of course, go through the entire sequence; for some, moral behavior--or at least certain aspects of moral behavior--may remain fixated at earlier levels of development. Furthermore, though a person may have internalized a particular standard of moral behavior, he may still react at the level of identification or compliance in specific situations.

Let me turn now to the second column of table 5.2, which deals with deviations from standards of propriety, and examine each of its three cells.

(1) *Embarrassment.* In this cell, P has somehow failed to live up to his self-presentation. He has behaved publicly in a way that falls short of the expectations that go with a specific role to which he lays claim or with the general role of an adult in the society. For example, he has shown himself to be incompetent, inadequate, clumsy, or socially maladroit. His primary concern is with the public image that he has created--with the possibility that others will react negatively to his behavior and disapprove of him. What is at issue for him is not his own sense of competence, adequacy, and so on, but what he has communicated about himself to others. He may be particularly concerned that others will draw conclusions about his general characteristics on the basis of his failure in this specific situation. In this connection, feelings of embarrassment may be stronger in the presence of strangers than in the presence of friends, since friends are unlikely to draw general conclusions on the basis of P's behavior in this one situation, while for strangers this is the only available sample of P's behavior. One of the ways of dealing with embarrassment is to cover up the discrepant action--to pretend that it did not happen or that it did not mean what it seemed to convey. For example, if P fails in a task in which he claimed competence, he may pretend that he was not seriously trying to succeed or that his earlier claim had really been meant as a joke. If the fact of his failure cannot be denied, he may try to deny its implications by finding ways of demonstrating that he possesses the com-

petence that has just been thrown into question--e.g., by performing a little jig as he comes out of a stumble. Another way of dealing with embarrassment is self-ridicule, which has the effect of disarming others and softening the impact of their ridicule, of showing your own control of the situation, and of communicating that you find it so funny because it is so uncharacteristic of you.

(2) *Shame*. Unlike embarrassment, shame does not involve a mere concern with one's public image, but a concern with one's personal image as reflected in the public image. P's failure to live up to his self-presentation exposes what he regards as a possible underlying weakness. He is not really concerned with the way others, in the immediate interaction situation, will react to his deviation, but with its implications for a role in which his own self-definition is anchored. The deviation raises serious questions about his embeddedness in the role, his ability to live up to its expectations, and thus his long-term place in the social system. As in the case of guilt, he tries to deal with the situation by seeking ways of reestablishing his relationship to society, which has been threatened. A characteristic reaction would involve some attempt to compensate for his failing, for example, by achieving success in other aspects of role performance. If his demands on himself are excessive and he finds it impossible to reestablish his relationship to society, his reaction may take the form of self-contempt. Self-contempt to the point of considering oneself inadequate to enact any of his roles in society may lead to suicide. Suicide, incidentally, is also a possible reaction to extreme guilt, where it represents the ultimate form of self-punishment.

(3) *Self-disappointment*. In this cell, finally, P has failed to live up to standards of propriety that are part of his personal value system--for example, his own standards of quality and his own definition of what is required in the performance of a task or the enactment of a role. In keeping with his values, he is primarily concerned with the task performance or the role enactment in which he has fallen short. He is not worried about his social standing or the solidity of his relationship to society, but he is disappointed in him-

self and his own achievements. One characteristic reaction to his self-disappointment is to examine his behavior in order to understand where he has failed and to determine how he might improve in the future. Another possible reaction is to examine his standards, in order to see whether these have been unrealistic--whether he has been expecting more of himself than he could deliver. Such an examination may lead to a revision of his standards accompanied by a greater degree of self-acceptance.

The three cells in the second column do not seem to correspond as clearly to developmental stages as do the three cells in the first column. In fact, Nancy Thalhofer has suggested that the developmental sequence might even be reversed. Embarrassment actually represents a high degree of social development. Along with regret, it calls for a considerable amount of empathy. It also presupposes an awareness that the way in which a person presents himself is a matter of great moment to others in his environment. By contrast, self-disappointment--in a rudimentary form--may be viewed as a more primitive reaction. In other words, disappointment with reference to a set of personal expectations may manifest itself at an earlier developmental stage than shame and embarrassment. On the other hand, it should be noted that self-disappointment, as presented in the present scheme, implies a rather high level of development, since it involves considerable self-consciousness and a well-articulated value system.

One final point can be made about table 5.2. From "society's point of view"--that is, from the point of view of social control--guilt and shame are often the most desirable reactions, even though from the individual's point of view they may turn out to be the most destructive. Societies, it seems to me, encourage guilt and shame because social control is usually most effective at the level of identification. Individuals operating at the level of compliance are insufficiently socialized; their adherence to social norms depends on surveillance, which makes them less reliable and more difficult to control. Individuals operating at the level of internalization are, in a sense, excessively socialized from the point of view of agencies charged with social control. Since societal standards are in-

tegrated with their personal value systems, they tend to make their own judgments about the validity of authoritative demands. Their conformity to such demands is, thus, more conditional. Individuals operating at the level of identification are likely to conform to authoritative demands with less surveillance than those at the level of compliance, and with less questioning than those at the level of internalization. Identification, with its associated emotions of guilt and shame, can thus be seen as the influence process most conducive to social control.

INFLUENCE UNDER CONDITIONS OF LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY

Implicit in my discussion of deviations from societal standards is the assumption that individuals generally live up to societal demands at some level. The question of how individuals are induced to live up to these demands leads us directly to a special case of social influence: influence under conditions of legitimate authority. Legitimate authority is a domain of influence that by its nature must be conceptualized in terms of linkages between the individual and the social system. On the one hand, legitimacy is a property of the social system, determined by the character and environment of the system. On the other hand, it cannot be defined entirely in terms of objective characteristics of the system itself, since it has no meaning apart from the individuals who perceive it and the groups that share the norms defining it.

For a long time, I had great conceptual difficulty in relating legitimate power to my three-process model of social influence. Thus, for example, of the five bases of power distinguished by French and Raven (1959), legitimacy was the only one that could not be clearly coordinated with the three processes of influence. However, as the model evolved to deal with linkages between the individual and the social system, it became increasingly receptive to the linkage concept of legitimacy. The formulation at which I finally arrived differs from that of French and Raven. They view legitimacy as a separate base of power, commensurate with the other four bases. By contrast, I view it as cutting across my three processes of influence, so that it may be asso-

ciated with any one of the three sources of power differentiated by my model--means-control, attractiveness, and credibility. I shall return to this point later, after examining the character of legitimate influence more generally.

According to my present formulation, all forms of social influence (whether or not it emanates from legitimate authorities) are seen as responsive to demands of the social system or of one of its components, and as mediating the integration of the individual into the social system. What is unique about situations of legitimate influence, however, is that the influencing agent is perceived as having the *right* to exert influence--to make demands--within the particular domain in question, by virtue of his position in the social system. Thus, for example, when the duly constituted administration of a legitimate political system makes certain demands, citizens feel under an obligation to accept them, regardless of their personal preferences. Once a demand is categorized as legitimate, the individual essentially finds himself in a situation in which his preferences have become more or less irrelevant for determining his actions. This situation differs from the usual influence situation represented, for example, in most influence experiments, where the individual chooses his behavior in terms of his personal preferences. The influencing agent in those situations has to communicate to the influencee, in some fashion, that accepting the induced behavior would be preferable from the point of view of achieving his goals. O may do this through persuasion, or negotiation, or setting an example, or offering rewards, or even through coercion. In all of these cases, P has to become convinced that adopting the induced behavior is preferable for him. In situations of legitimate influence, by contrast, O does not have to convince P that adopting the induced behavior is preferable for him, given the available alternatives, but merely that it is required of him. P's reactions are governed not so much by motivational processes as by perceptual ones. A legitimate demand has the quality of requiredness that one often associates with external reality. Legitimate power implies that O has the authority to define the dimensions of the situation to which P must relate himself. This authority,

incidentally, extends to both of the domains differentiated in table 5.2: O has the right to define both P's responsibilities as a system member and the limits of propriety for P's role performance.

I have made a sharp distinction between influence situations involving legitimate authority and those involving preferential choice in order to clarify what I see as the essential nature of legitimacy. In actual fact, most influence situations cannot be that sharply differentiated. They involve elements of both motivated preference and perceived requiredness, which enter into conflict with one another. Situations differ, however, in terms of the balance between the two. To the extent that elements of requiredness predominate, removing the situation from preferential choice, some of the dramatic outcomes that are associated with influence under conditions of legitimate authority become possible. On the one hand, we have situations in which individuals take actions in response to legitimate demands that are clearly against their personal preferences and short-term interests, often calling for considerable sacrifices. The ability of authorities to elicit such sacrifices from system members--which in turn depends on the extent to which the system itself is perceived as legitimate--allows the system to function on a basis of consent, with relatively little need to resort to coercion or to confront constant challenges. On the other hand, we have situations in which individuals take actions that they would normally consider antisocial and immoral--as in the My Lai massacre or the Milgram (1963) experiment--because these actions have become legitimized. In accepting the legitimacy of the authorities, the individuals tend to relinquish control and responsibility to them and to obey their demands without question (cf. Kelman and Lawrence, 1972).

Even though an influencing agent is perceived as legitimate, his demands are not always obeyed without question. I said earlier that P finds himself in a situation in which his preferences have become irrelevant *once a demand is categorized as legitimate*. The picture changes, however, if a particular demand or series of demands is seen as illegitimate or nonlegitimate--not because it goes counter to P's preferences,

but because it fails to meet certain external criteria. To challenge the legitimacy of a demand is very difficult, particularly when O is surrounded by the trappings of authority. There are great differences among individuals in their ability to make such challenges; the ability to do so depends, for example, on such factors as position in society, availability of appropriate models, and level of moral development. But there are definitely conditions under which the legitimacy of authoritative demands *is* challenged and, indeed, there are criteria for mounting such challenges.

Criteria for challenging the legitimacy of a demand are built into the very conception of legitimate power. Legitimacy implies that power is exercised within certain limits and according to certain rules, rather than in an arbitrary fashion. The perceived legitimacy of a demand depends, therefore, on the degree to which it conforms to the established procedures and constraints. There is always an external reference point--a constitution, a code of laws, a set of institutionalized practices or traditional customs--to which both the system's members and its leadership are subject. There are thus specifiable ways of determining whether or not a given demand is legitimate. Moreover, if the system is to be perceived as legitimate, it provides mechanisms of recourse (such as court tests or the ombudsman) that permit members to challenge official actions they deem illegitimate on procedural grounds--on the grounds that they are outside the domain of O's power, or that the way they have been executed is in violation of the rules. The perceived legitimacy of authoritative demands depends not only on procedural considerations, but also on the extent to which the policies in which they are embedded conform to the basic values on which the legitimacy of the system itself ultimately rests. In short, then, demands from legitimate authorities can be challenged on the grounds that they violate the established procedures or the underlying values of the system. Thus, even in seemingly pure situations of legitimate authority, P may resist influence; but he would do so, not simply because he finds the induced behavior personally undesirable, but because he feels that acceptance is not required of him--i.e., that the demand is not legitimate or is, indeed, illegitimate.

Given this formulation, one of the most important and most interesting questions for empirical exploration concerns the conditions under which individuals will feel free (or even obligated) to challenge authoritative demands. I would hypothesize that a key factor is the manner in which the individual is integrated into the social system, which is equivalent to the process by which he accepts the system's legitimacy. Before elaborating on this hypothesis, let me present in summary fashion a classification of patterns of personal involvement in social systems from which the hypothesis is derived. The model is specifically concerned with the national system, but it should be equally applicable to the involvement of individuals in other kinds of social systems.

Personal involvement in the system translates directly into perceived legitimacy of the system. That is, to the extent that a system member is in some fashion personally involved in the system--to the extent that he feels attached to it and is integrated into its operations--he will perceive the system as legitimate. Table 5.3 presents six patterns of personal involvement in (and hence perceived legitimacy of) the national system.

The six patterns result from the interaction of two qualitative dimensions. The rows represent two sources of attachment or loyalty to the system--sentimental and instrumental attachment. The columns represent three ways in which the individual is integrated into the system--ideological, role-participant, and normative integration. In other words, the rows distinguish, essentially, two types of motives of the individual that lead him to cathect the system. The columns, on the other hand, represent the three components of the system via which members may be bound into it--its values, its roles, and its rules or norms. To put it more simply, the rows define why individuals are loyal to the system, the columns define what it is they are loyal to.

For our present purposes, we are primarily concerned with the columns, which refer to the three components of social systems corresponding to the three processes of social influence. The three processes of influence contribute to the present model in two senses: they help define the way in which a particular type of inte-

TABLE 5.3. Patterns of Personal Involvement in the National System*

		Manner of Integration into the System		
(System requirements conducive to this type of integration)		(Consolidation)	(Mobilization)	(Conformity)
(Influence process characteristic of this type of integration)		(Internalization of system values)	(Identification with system roles)	(Compliance with system demands seen as legitimate)
		Ideological	*Role-Participant*	*Normative*
Source of Attachment (Loyalty) to the System	*Sentimental*	Commitment to cultural values reflective of national identity	Commitment to the role of national linked to group symbols	Acceptance of demands based on commitment to the sacredness of the state
	Instrumental	Commitment to institutions promotive of the needs and interests of the population	Commitment to social roles mediated by the system	Acceptance of demands based on commitment to law and order (principle of equity)

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gration is initially established, and the way in which an individual integrated via each of these components is likely to react to a specific system demand. Let me briefly review each of the three columns in these terms:

(1) *Ideological integration.* An individual who is ideologically integrated is bound to the system by virtue of the fact that he subscribes to some of the basic values on which the system is established. These may be the cultural values defining the national identity, or the social values reflected in the institutions by which the society is organized, or both. The ideologically integrated member has internalized these values and incorporated them into a personal value framework. When he is faced with demands for behavior in support of the national system he is likely to respond positively, because support of the system is generally congruent with his own values. The extent to which he meets specific demands, however, depends on the extent to which he sees these demands as consistent with the underlying values of the system to which he is committed.

(2) *Role-participant integration.* An individual who is integrated via role-participation is bound to the system by virtue of the fact that he is personally engaged in roles within the system--roles that enter significantly into his self-definition. He may be emotionally caught up in the role of national as such, with its associated symbols, and derive a sense of self-transcendence and compensatory identity from it; or he may be functionally caught up in various social roles that are central to his identity and whose effective performance depends on the national system. His integration into the system is based on identification, in the sense that he has a stake in maintaining the system-related roles and the self-definition anchored in them. When he is faced with demands to support the system he is likely to respond positively, because such support is generally required by the system role to which he is committed. The extent to which he meets specific demands depends, however, on the extent to which the relevant role has been brought into salience by situational factors.

> (3) *Normative integration.* An individual who is normatively integrated is bound to the system by virtue of the fact that he accepts the system's right to set the behavior of its members within a prescribed domain. Here we are dealing, one might say, with legitimacy in its pure form, in which the question of personal values and roles has become irrelevant. Acceptance of the system's right to unquestioning obedience may be based on a commitment to the state as a sacred object in its own right, or on a commitment to the necessity of law and order as a guarantor of equitable procedures. The normatively integrated member regards compliance with the system as a highly proper and valued orientation. When he is faced with demands to support the system he is likely to comply without question, since he regards it as his obligation to do so. The extent to which he meets specific demands, however, depends on the extent to which these are authoritatively presented as the wishes of the leadership or the requirements of law. One important indicator of the authoritativeness of a particular demand is the existence of positive or negative sanctions to control proper performance (Kelman 1969, pp. 286-87).

We can now return to the question I raised earlier about the conditions under which individuals will feel free--and obligated--to challenge authoritative demands. I would propose that those who accept the legitimacy of the system by virtue of the fact that they share its basic values are most likely to challenge the legitimacy of certain specific demands. They usually provide the most important long-run support for the system, but they are not always "dependable" in the short run, in that their support is contingent on the system's living up to its (and their) values. It is not surprising that civil disobedience is most likely to arise among this group of ideologically integrated members. By contrast, those whose integration is primarily at the normative level are most likely to accept authoritative demands without question. Though they tend to give reliable, unquestioning obedience, they are likely to be passive and lacking in creativity. From the point of view of the system, those who are integrated at the

level of role participation are the ideal members, since they are more dependable in their support than the value-integrated members, but at the same time more enthusiastic than the normatively integrated ones. This observation is directly related to my earlier point that identification, with its associated emotions of guilt and shame, can be seen as the influence process most conducive to social control.

As I pointed out at the beginning of my remarks about legitimate influence and demonstrated in table 5.3 and elsewhere, I propose that influence under conditions of legitimate authority may take different forms, corresponding to the processes of compliance, identification, and internalization, which were originally designed to handle influence under conditions of preferential choice. While I see important parallels between the two types of influence situations, then, I would also hypothesize certain differences between them. These differences can be traced to the differences in the psychological situations in which people find themselves under conditions of legitimacy (where they acknowledge the right of the influencing agent to set behavior for them) as compared to the conditions of preferential choice.

Perhaps the most notable differences occur in the case of compliance. Compliance poses special difficulties because the original model postulates coercive power as one of its possible determinants; legitimate influence, on the other hand, is by definition noncoercive. Nevertheless, I feel that the parallelism is sufficiently close to treat both as variants of the same influence process. Compliance in a situation of legitimate authority is similar to compliance in the original model in that the influencee's behavior in both situations is controlled by the existence of positive or negative sanctions. In the original model, however, sanctions constitute a *motivation* for compliance. That is, the person complies in order to obtain a particular reward or avoid a particular punishment. In the context of legitimate demands, sanctions still play an important part in control and compliance, but primarily as *indicators* that the demands are really authoritative and meant to be obeyed, rather than as motivators for the choice that would be personally most rewarding.

I would further predict that the reactions accompanying compliance would differ in the the two situations. A person complying in a preferential choice situation is likely to experience a certain amount of resentment because his opportunities for choice have been limited. This would be particularly true if compliance is achieved through coercive tactics. A person complying under conditions of legitimate authority, on the other hand, is less likely to be resentful, because he sees it as the right of the influencing agent not only to demand compliance, but also to impose sanctions for noncompliance. By testing such hypotheses as the one just described, comparing the side effects of compliance, identification, and internalization in the two types of influence situations, we can gain some insight into the nature of legitimate authority as well as the psychological mechanisms that mediate influence in general.

NOTE

1. This clasification, and many of the ideas relating to it, developed in the course of a long series of discussions with Nancy Thalhofer, when we were both at the University of Michigan. I am greatly indebted to Dr. Thalhofer for stimulating my thinking along these lines.

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